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Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a
Method To Reduce Madness in Post-9/11
Power and Rights Conflicts
MARIO L. BARNES*
GREG BOWMAN**

F.

PROLOGUE (TO THE PAST)

This project was originally conceived at what we believed to be a
unique moment in our nation's history: After September 11, in what we
perceived as a period of temporary emergency, we were confronted with
a series of governmental actions-primarily executive in nature-that
resulted in citizens and noncitizens, persons within the United States and
those on battlefields, being designated as enemy combatants and being
subjected to various kinds of detentions and trials. Given the dearth of
judicial opinions that existed to guide the path of executive and (to a
lesser extent) congressional action, in these post-September 11 matters,
we described these circumstances as "unprecedented terrain."'
In response to this state of domestic affairs, we initially sought to
compose a methodology for examining the tradeoff between power and
individual rights inherent in the aforementioned executive actions and
the cases that challenged them. We first began to compose this method
in 2004, before the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that
provided some answers as to the contours of acceptable executive decisionmaking 2 in what has now become, perhaps, a semipermanent state
of emergency.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A., J.D., University of California,
Berkeley; LL.M., University of Wisconsin, Madison.
** Williams & Connolly LLP. B.S., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School.
We would like to thank: Charlton Copeland, Ben Depoorter, Michael Froomkin, Patrick
Gudridge, and Stephen Schnably, for comments on earlier drafts of this article; Shannelle Boyd,
Rashied McDuffie, and Cyrus Rieck for providing research assistance; and, the editors of the
University of Miami Law Review for their patience and thoughtfulness.
1. This part of the title speaks both to the lack of judicial guidance that existed immediately
after September 11 and what seemed to be an extremely aggressive posture with regard to the
President's actions in response to the tragedy. See infra note 17, 25 and accompanying text.
2. We first presented our thoughts on this matter at the 2004 Law and Society Annual
Meeting in Chicago while the decisions were pending at the U.S. Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (which was decided with Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
2003)), Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Together with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006), we refer to these cases as the first
wave of challenges to post-September 11 designations, detentions, and trials.
3. For a comment that we are now engaged in a state of permanent or normalized
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While the first wave of cases has come and gone, questions remain
related to the scope of the detentions, the justifications for providing
various terrorist suspects different forms of designations and trials, and
the proper balance between executive power and individual rights. The
Court's initial set of opinions has turned out to be prescriptive, but not
reconciliatory, on questions central to our inquiry and method. So, more
than six years after September 11, and three years after our initial formulations, we find that we are still confronted with post-September 11
questions and pending cases that cry out for a balanced approach for
their resolution.
Below, we introduce our project by explaining why and how it was
first conceived and by describing the method we developed to organize
the various rule options available to resolve issues presented by the terrorism and detention cases. Here, we both assess which of various rule
alternatives we have identified actually shaped the opinions in the first
wave of cases and consider (anew) the possibility our "unified
approach" presents for resolving the issues that remain in the emerging
wave of new cases.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the trends of globalization and the spread of capitalism
are not new, the twentieth century's revolutionary advances in communication and transportation sparked an unprecedented intensification and
acceleration of these trends, 4 resulting in a growing westernization of the
world. Westernization, which has not been universally embraced, has
contributed to intense and sometimes violent cultural clashes.' At the
same time, globalization and the spread of capitalism have produced an
intertwined world in which local and small-scale acts of terrorism have
exerted significant influences on the policies of the world's most poweremergency, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REv. 835, 839-41 (2006);
see also Mark Danner, Taking Stock of the Forever War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 45.
4. See Jeffrey Sachs, Galen L. Stone Professor of Int'l Trade, Harvard Univ., Remarks at
Yale Law School Alumni Weekend: Globalization and the Rule of Law (Oct. 16, 1998), in YALE
LAW SCHOOL OCCASIONAL PAPERS 3-5 (1998), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/

2.
5. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?,FOREIGN Ari., Summer 1993,
at 22-23 (tracing the evolution of violent conflict in the modem world from contests between
princes to nation states to ideologies to cultural groupings); Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim
Rage, THEATLANTIC.COM, Sept. 1990, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage
("[W]e are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the
governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations-the perhaps irrational
but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular
present, and the world-wide expansion of both.").
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ful nations, much as small forces are magnified and fluidly transmitted
in a hydraulic system.6
It is the demonstrated hydraulic force of local attacks and the
impingement of Western values upon the Muslim world that seem to
have fostered increased investment in terrorism and growth in its
employment as a policy-shaping tool against the "far enemy," the United
States.7 Since 1992, al Qaeda has used terrorism to further a far more
ambitious goal than previously attempted: to end U.S. influence in the
world generally.8 This broader agenda has led to the implementation
and pursuit of far more ruthless tactics than previously observed, and the
agenda climaxed with the devastating attacks of September 11. 9
The September 11 attacks altered, perhaps permanently, the U.S.
security paradigm,10 and brought to light the nation's many continuing
vulnerabilities. The attacks' notorious successes in destroying important
6. We-are mindful that in a different context, Mr. Justice Douglas used a similar metaphor to
describe the presence of "powerful hydraulic pressures" arising out of contemporary problems,
serving as the impetus to "water down constitutional guarantees." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
7. See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 118 (2002)
(explaining that one of the characteristics that distinguishes al Qaeda from other terrorist groups is
its focus on the United States, as the "ultimate fountain of corruption on earth").
8. See id. at 119 ("But it is ultimately not a single American policy, such as stationing troops
in Lebanon, or even in Saudi Arabia, that is the issue. Instead, it is America's very presence in the
world, the fundamentals of its relationship with dozens of Muslim countries and its relationship
with Israel, which arouses the ire of al-Qaeda. America itself, and the essentials of the world
order it supports, are what must be attacked.").
9. As others have previously argued:
The combination of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction is the stuff of
countless movies and television shows. The reality is otherwise: very, very few
groups have ever seriously tried to acquire such weapons. Almost all of those that
have-the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo is the most notable exception-have
sought them primarily for purposes of blackmail. Reading history backward, it is
clear that extortion is not part of al-Qaeda's inventory of tactics. Its forays into
procuring unconventional arms are an unmistakable sign that al-Qaeda is prepared
to cross a threshold never before approached and kill in a way unlike that of any
earlier terrorists. The period of this activity roughly coincides with that of the
group's decision to focus on waging war against the United States, and it is hard to
imagine that the two matters were not linked.
Id. at 129.
10. As then Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh stated:
This is the enemy we face: a criminal whose objective is not crime but fear; a
mass murderer who kills only as a means to a greater end; a predator whose victims
are all innocent civilians; a warrior who exploits the rule of war; a war criminal who
recognizes no boundaries and who reaches all comers of the world.
To confront this threat, the Department of Justice needed a fundamentally new
paradigm, different from the way we approached the traditional task of law
enforcement. Unlike traditional soldiers, terrorists waged war dressed not in
camouflage, but in the colors of street clothing. Unlike traditional criminals,
terrorists are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to take the lives of
innocents.
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American symbols will likely lead to future attempts.1 1 Although the
Bush administration's priorities before September 11 have been the sub-

ject of much criticism and conjecture,1 2 it is clear that after September
11, the administration, as well as Congress, understood that future
attempts to attack the United States were inevitable and that new measures would be required to prevent or minimize the effect of such future

attacks.
A number of initiatives have been undertaken in the effort to recon-

stitute domestic security including: (a) permitting criminal investigators
and intelligence officials far greater freedom to share information and

cooperate on investigations; 3 (b) providing for more flexible surveillance rules;14 and (c) more aggressively pursuing the removal of aliens
suspected of terrorist activity.15 In addition, one of the most significant
policy changes after September 11 has been the Department of
Defense's decision to detain "enemy combatants" captured in the prosecution of the global War on Terror.16 This policy has given rise to a
series of additional executive decisions that have sought to claim a right
Stephen R. McAllister, Viet Dinh, Erwin Chemerinsky, Christopher Stone & Jeffrey Rosen, Life
After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 219, 222-23 (2003).
11. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 7, at 118-19.
12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON
TERROR (2004).
13. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. IX,
§§ 901-908, 115 Stat. 272, 387-91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 50
U.S.C.).
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AuTHoRriEs SUPPORTING THE AcTIvTIs OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at http://www.epic.

org/privacy/terrorisn/fisa/dojll906wp.pdf

[hereinafter

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

LEGAL

AUTHORITIES]. Finding this to be another arena where the President was asserting unprecedented
authority, the warrantless surveillance program was originally struck down by Judge Anna Diggs
Taylor in ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). That decision, however, was
overturned due to a lack of standing after the plaintiffs could not prove that they had been targeted
by the challenged searches. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007).
15. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 401-418, 115 Stat. at 342-56.
16. Several hundred enemy combatants are being held at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba. For a history of the number of persons detained and released since 2002, see Global
Security.org, Guantdnamo Bay Detainees, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
guantanamo-baydetainees.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). The enemy-combatant designation
pertains to individuals who engage in war-fighting activities, without belonging to an armed force
of a recognized foreign State. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, GUANTANAMO DETAINEES, available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/d20040406gua.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2008); U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, COMBATANT STATUS REvIEw TRIBUNALS, available at http://www.defense
link.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%2OFact%2OSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (indicating that
between July 2004 and March 2005, the Department of Defense conducted 558 combatant-status
reviews at Guantnamo Bay, which determined 520 detainees were enemy combatants); see also
Ex pane Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (applying the enemy-combatant designation to detained
German saboteurs, who the Court held were not entitled to habeas relief and could be tried by
presidentially appointed military commissions). For an argument that Quirin should be viewed
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for the President to define the terms of these detentions, the types of
trials extended to those detained, and the scope of any appeal to the
detentions or trials.17
Not surprisingly, these new security initiatives have been the subject of intense and polarized debate. The administration's detention and

trial of enemy combatants has taken a central role in that debate, as
representative of controversial aspects that critics have charged underlie
a number of the new security measures-extremely broad executive

power,' 8 limitation of the role of the judiciary, 19 secrecy, injection of an
express "us-them" categorization, and an apparent rejection of the international human-rights norms that might have been followed. Unlike

many of the other factors at play in the debate-such as globalization,
the growing recognition of international human-rights norms, and the
recent judicial trend eroding the distinction between aliens and citi-

zens-the U.S. government's continuing effort to reconstitute domestic
security is a unique, post-September 11 challenge.
A number of scholars have supported the government's actions, 20

or at least judicial deference to them in a time of crisis.2 ' Such a position would sanction the military's power to detain, indefinitely without
trial or access to legal counsel, anyone who has taken up arms in futherance of a terrorist plan against the United States. In the case of designated alien-enemy combatants captured and detained abroad, such as
onboard the U.S. Naval Base in Guantdnamo Bay, we are now in the

process of evaluating what will be a second wave of legal challenges. In
2004 our initial questions pertained to whether such detentions were

beyond the U.S. courts' jurisdiction to consider.2 2 Essentially, the queswithin the historical context of the development of habeas corpus jurisprudence and should not be
applied today, see A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 309.
17. The latter two issues have recently been defined by legislation. See Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28 & 42 of U.S.C.). The President first sought to limit these matters through an
Executive Order, but the Supreme Court struck it down in Hamdan v. United States, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006).
18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War
on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 4, 7-19 (2006) (criticizing the Executive exercising broad
and mostly unchecked power in the areas of detentions, eavesdropping, and torture).
19. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, JurisdictionStripping,
and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1002
passim (2007).
20. See, e.g., JOHN Yoo, WAR By OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR (2006).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY

(2006); ERIc A.

POSNER

&

ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:

SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE].

22. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming the district
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tions related to whether the Executive would be permitted to continue

such practices with no judicial review of individual cases and whether
the petitioners would be forced to resort to diplomatic efforts to obtain
concessions from the U.S. government.2 3 Moreover, we were concerned
about the administration's signaled intent to create a system of military
commissions and to charge some of the aliens detained at Guantdnamo
with crimes.2 4
In the case of U.S. citizens, whether captured on the battlefield
abroad or unarmed within the United States, the administration argued
the judiciary's role was limited to ensuring that the Executive relied on
"some evidence" in designating the citizen an enemy combatant, 5 and
whether that designation could justify citizens being held indefinitely in
military confinement with no ability to challenge that detention.26
court's finding of no jurisdiction and permitting the continued detention of petitioners, enemy
combatants, held at Guantdnamo Bay); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 73 (D.D.C. 2002)
(dismissing habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction), rev'd, 103 F. App'x 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
23. Diplomatic negotiations seem to have, in fact, shaped the U.S. detention policies. See,
e.g., Press Release No. 180-04, U.S. Dep't of Def., Transfer of Afghani and Pakistani Detainees
Complete (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7133;
Press Release No. 155-04, Dep't of Def., Transfer of British Detainees Complete (Mar. 9, 2004),
Press Release No. 127-04,
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8154;
Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainee Complete (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7090 (announcing transfer of Danish national); Press Release No.
105-04, Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainee Complete (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.defenselink.
mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7077 (announcing transfer of Spanish detainee); Press Release
No. 136-04, Dep't of Def., Transfer of Detainees Complete (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.defense
link.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7100 (announcing transfer of Russian detainees); Press
Release No. 892-03, Dep't of Def., U.S. and Australia Announce Agreements on Guantanamo
Detainees (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5818.
24. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001) (announcing the intention to subject noncitizen
detainees to military commissions).
25. At the district court level, Judge Doumar described Hamdi's situation as follows:
This case appears to be the first in American jurisprudence where an American
citizen has been held incommunicado and subjected to an indefinite detention in the
continental United States without charges, without any findings by a military
tribunal, and without access to a lawyer.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002) (ordering the government to
produce documents, which supplied the basis for Hamdi being labeled an enemy combatant); see
also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699, 712-16 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the President lacked
authority to detain a U.S. citizen without express congressional authorization and remanding the
case directing the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and free the petitioner from
military detention). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 477 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding
Hamdi's detention based upon evidence submitted by the government without a chance for
rebuttal); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ordering
that Padilla be permitted access to counsel and opportunity to rebut the government's evidence but
announcing that the detention would be reviewed under deferential "some evidence" standard).
26. At the time, this also described the condition of Jose Padilla, who was designated as an
enemy combatant for his alleged role in a terrorist plot. Padilla was held for over three years in a
naval brig in South Carolina. His initial challenge to his detention was reviewed by the U.S.
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Decisions in the first detention cases answered initial queries
regarding the quality of process to be afforded those wishing to challenge their enemy-combatant status and whether the U.S. courts are open
to challenges from aliens detained outside the United States. The
Supreme Court even unearthed a modem era Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer 7 analysis to place limits on the power of the Executive to create the aforementioned commissions. z8 These answers, however, did not fully address the expansive set of questions related to
designations, detentions, and trials in terrorism-related matters.
New questions have emerged regarding the propriety of congressionally authorized military commissions, 9 whether the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") authorizes the government to summarily detain
noncitizens within the United States without criminal charging,30 what
limits are imposed by statute and international law on crimes tried in
such courts, and the effects of statutory provisions stripping habeas
corpus jurisdiction from federal appellate courts. 3 1 There are also burgeoning questions as to whether habeas relief must be afforded U.S. citiSupreme Court but dismissed because it incorrectly named the U.S. Secretary of Defense rather
than the commanding officer of the naval brig as the respondent, and it was incorrectly filed in
New York rather than in South Carolina. For the Supreme Court's rendition of these facts, see
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 426 (2004). Subsequently, in January 2006, Mr. Padilla was
moved to Miami and faced a federal criminal indictment. See United States v. Padilla, No. 0460001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) (denying Padilla's motion to
dismiss). Padilla, and codefendants, Adham Hassoun and Kifa Jayyousi, were convicted of
conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim overseas; conspiracy to provide material support to
terrorists; and providing material support for terrorists. See Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane,
Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at Al.
27. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
28. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); see also Neal Katyal, Equality in the
War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2007) (providing a comparative analysis of
Hamdan and Youngstown); Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and the
Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 934-35,
960-63 (2007) (analyzing Hamdan as a modem-day Youngstown).
29. This question exists largely as a function of Congress enacting the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28
& 42 of U.S.C.), which is substantially similar to the executive order the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down for want of congressional authorization in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75, but whose
substantive provisions remain largely unanalyzed by the Court.
30. Ali Saleh Kahlah A1-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, was picked up in the Illinois in 2001 and
since has been detained as an enemy combatant. He is presently being held at the U.S. Navy brig
in South Carolina, where he has been interrogated but not charged. See Adam Liptak, Court Says
Military Cannot Hold 'Enemy Combatant,' N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at Al. Recently, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the MCA does not authorize this variety of unbounded
stateside detention and that Mr. Al Marri must either be charged with a crime or deported. See Al
Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). The case is currently awaiting an en banc
rehearing.
31. The MCA eliminates habeas corpus jurisdiction for detainees determined to be enemy
combatants. Military Commissions Act § 950j(b), 120 Stat. at 2623-24. For claims that this
jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
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zens detained abroad as enemy combatants.32 While the Executive is no

longer acting alone, the courts having joined the conversation, the challenge remains to construct a juridical process that will effectively balance the space between governmental power and individual rights.
Essentially, the actions of the Bush administration, recently
endorsed in part by Congress,33 remain at the center of an intense and
polarized, if largely superficial, debate over the application of U.S. constitutional protections and the role of the judiciary and Congress in the
detention and trials of enemy combatants at Guantinamo and within the
United States. 34 The debate itself has proceeded on largely divergent
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029,
2061-64 (2007). See generally Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 19.
32. The U.S. Supreme Court is considering this question in the consolidated cases of Omar v.
Harvey, 479 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom., Geren v. Omar, 128 S. Ct. 741
(2007) and Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 741 (2007).
The cases, which were argued on March 25, 2008, involve citizens detained abroad in Iraq who
have been denied access to habeas, either based upon their being held by the Multi-National Force
or being convicted by an Iraqi court. See David G. Savage, Iraq Is New Front in Detainee Battle:
Clash Over Habeas Corpus Rights Moves from Guantanamoto Baghdad, A.B.A.J., Mar. 2008, at
20-22. Separate panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit split on the issue of the
availability of habeas. One panel determined that jurisdiction existed in federal court for Omar's
habeas claim. Harvey, 479 F.3d at 5-6. A different panel held that due to his conviction by the
Iraqi court, there was no habeas jurisdiction in Munaf's case. Munaf, 482 F.3d at 583. This
distinction may be moot given reporting that Munaf's Iraqi conviction has been overturned. See
Posting of Kevin Jon Heller to Opinio Juris, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1204451414.shtml
(Mar. 2, 2008, 4:50 EST).
33. Initially, the Executive claimed that many of its post-September 11 actions were endorsed
by Congress through a joint congressional resolution adopted on September 28, 2001. See
Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541). The Supreme Court, in Hamdi, found the AUMF
language instructing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to be explicit
authorization for post-September 11 detentions. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
The MCA is an express adoption of many of the procedures endorsed by the President in the order
he issued on November 13, 2001. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). Since the passage of the MCA,
the Executive has also issued the Manual for Military Commissions. U.S. DEF'T OF DEF.,
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/d20070118MCM.pdf.
34. For a broadly negative critique of the exercise of executive power after September 11, see
DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2d ed. 2002). Compare JACK GOLDSMITH, THE
TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (criticizing
as well as defending, post-September 11 presidential decisions from the perspective of a former
head counsel in the Department of Justice), with Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and
Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002) (providing an extremely positive critique of
the post-September 11 executive orders), and Kenneth Anderson, What To Do with Bin Laden
andAl Qaeda Terrorists?:A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy
on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 45 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 609-10 (2002)
(arguing in favor of the use of the military tribunals outlined in the Executive Order, and noting
that "[tihe perpetrators of September 11 and other terrorist attacks are not morally and legally
analogous to the perpetrators of domestic crime in a settled domestic society").
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and mostly political paths, with little substantive engagement." This
seems to be at least partly attributable to the multiple legal paradigms at
work-paradigms that extend beyond any single traditional practice
group or scholarly area of expertise. But this dynamic of insular scholarly comment with little helpful substantive exchange also illustrates a
broader trend in legal scholarship in which diverse schools of thought
fail to engage in a common discourse.36
Scholars have observed that the two principal schools of legal
scholarship to have succeeded the legal formalism school,3 7 law and
economics ("L&E")38 and critical theories-a general term to describe
35. Compare Ruth Wedgwood, The Rule of Law and the War On Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2003, at A27 (referring to terrorism as a type of warfare that criminal prosecution cannot
necessarily root out and arguing the legitimacy of the executive power to detain citizens as a part
of the "war" effort from the perspective of a professor and former federal prosecutor), with
Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War On Terror, FOREIGNAFFAiRS.ORG, Jan./Feb. 2004,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101facomment83101/kenneth-roth/the-law-of-war-in-thewar-on-terror.html (questioning the legitimacy of detentions, why domestic criminal jurisdiction is
not appropriate, and whether the current conflict is "war," from the perspective of the Executive
Director of Human Rights Watch). While their positions remain hardened and opposed, more
recently commentators have at least begun to engage each other. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood &
Kenneth Roth, Combatants or Criminals? How Washington Should Handle Terrorists, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS.ORO, May/June 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faresponse83312/ruthwedgwood-kenneth-roth/combatants-or-criminals-how-washington-should-handle-terrfoists.html.
36. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysisof Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) [hereinafter Rubin, The New Legal
Process]. Notably, there have been contentious exchanges between proponents and detractors of
critical-race theory ("CRT") methodology. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (criticizing
CRT methodology) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories]; cf Richard Delgado, On
Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993)
(commenting on the commendable but ultimately flawed effort of Farber and Sherry); see also
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH

IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) [hereinafter BEYOND ALL REASON]; Anne Coughlin, Regulating the
Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1281-82
(1995) (criticizing the CRT use of narrative and autobiography); cf John 0. Calmore, Random
Notes of an Integration Warrior-Part2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" of
Daniel Farberand Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1589 (1999); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (1999) [hereinafter Culp, To the
Bone]; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity,
"Blunders," and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 69 (1996) [Culp, Telling
a Black Legal Story]; Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Race and Reason: The Assault on Critical Race
Theory and the Truth About Inequality, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1998-99). For a critique of
Farber and Sherry by a non-critical-race theory scholar, see Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth and
Critical Race Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 525 (1999) [hereinafter Rubin, Jews, Truth and Critical
Race Theory].
37. See Guido Calebresi, An Introduction To Legal Thought: FourApproaches to Law and to
the Allocation of Body Parts,55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2118 n.20 (2003) (describing Critical Legal
Studies and Law and Economics as "two prominent academic movements of the past 30 years"
that have taken up the antiformalist revolt, first started by the legal realists).
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Foreword, Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 899 (1985); Guido Calebresi, The
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the range of theories and movements emanating from Critical Legal
Studies ("CLS") 3 9-might be combined to form a new unified approach
to legal analysis.4" Notably, Edward Rubin has sketched the broad
parameters of such a unified approach with a methodology consisting of
the comparative microanalysis of institutions that examines tradeoffs of
social justice and efficiency and inhere in assigning responsibilities to
competing institutions. 4 ' In short, Rubin envisioned the possibility that
legal scholarship might benefit from analyzing together the tradeoffs in
the norms central to two schools of legal scholarship applied within this
article-L&E (efficiency) and CLS/CRT (social justice/antisubordination). Rubin convincingly explained the complex theoretical underpinnings of his belief that such an approach is possible and invited others to
apply such a technique to particular legal issues. Other scholars have
recently undertaken this task in myriad contexts. 42
New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PROC. BRrr.
ACAD. 85 (1982).
39. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrrICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Mark V. Tushnet,
Perspectives on CriticalLegal Studies: Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1984). More
recently, the CLS tradition has been succeeded by other progressive movements such as feminist
legal theory, CRT, and Latina/o Critical Theory ("LATCRIT"). On the emergence of CRT from
CLS, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
3-5 (2001) (noting CRT's link to CLS and defining the aim of CRT as "studying and
transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power"); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Foreword to CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY at XII-XIV
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY]; Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, The FirstDecade: CriticalReflections, or "A Foot in the Closing Door," 49
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1354-64 (2002); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911
World: CriticalRace Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717,
719-21 (2003). It is primarily the tenets and methodologies of CRT, rather than CLS more
generally, that will be applied in this article.
40. See Rubin, The New Legal Process, supra note 36, at 1411-13; see also Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Book Review, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1757 (2003). Robert Ellickson laid the foundation for such an approach by arguing that
the predictive powers of L&E might be sharpened by incorporating the insights of psychology and
sociology into the one-dimensional rational actor model. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).
41. See generally Rubin, The New Legal Process, supra note 36. Rubin also sets forth a
related alternative formulation in which the unified scholar might employ competing norms and
proceed to analyze marginal changes in justice and efficiency under competing normative
regimes. See id. at 1432-33.
42. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explored the application of the two disciplines
within the context of employment discrimination. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 40; see also
Clark Freshman, Prevention Perspectives on "Different" Kinds of Discrimination: From
Attacking Different "Isms" to Promoting Acceptance in Critical Race Theory, Law and
Economics, and Empirical Research, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2293, 2304-06 (2003) (suggesting that
L&E methods complement CRT approaches to identifying discrimination across a number of
subject areas while simultaneously reviewing separate CRT and L&E books on discrimination);
Daria Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst: The Assault on Radicals in American Law, 96 MICH.
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We believe that the security measures adopted by the United States
after September 11 are particularly well suited to such a unified analysis.
The characteristics underlying these measures-broad assertions of
executive power, limitation of the role of the judiciary, secrecy, and an
apparent rejection of international human-rights norms-present fundamental questions about the allocation of responsibilities among the three
branches of government in the face of a normative regime that contains
an express "us-them" dialectic.4 3 In addition, the claimed unilateral
authority of the government to choose among a number of legal regimes
for the treatment of these cases has prompted scrutiny as to the basis of
these decisions. 44 Specifically, commentators initially called for the
government to charge or release the detainees, by which such commentators presumably sought to divest the Executive of sole decision-making responsibility and vest such authority in the judiciary.4 5 These
commentators previously pointed to the cases of John Walker Lindh and
Zacarias Moussaoui, and now Jose Padilla and his co-conspirators, as
evidence that suspected terrorists can and should be prosecuted as
L. REV. 1658, 1682-83 (1998) (encouraging CRT scholars to strategically employ other schools
of legal scholarship to advance their own ideology).
43. Here, the "us" refers not to a simple citizen-alien distinction, but instead is a reference to
those considered as belonging to the U.S. body politic as opposed to those who are not. For
instance, in the wake of September 11, scholars have argued that even U.S. citizens of Arab
descent have not been viewed as a part of the "us." Leti Volpp has made this claim with regard to
the racial profiling of Middle Easterners:
The shift in perceptions of racial profiling is clearly grounded in the fact that
those individuals who are being profiled are not considered to be part of "us."
Many of those racially profiled in the sense of being the targets of hate violence or
being thrown off airplanes are formally citizens of the United States, through birth
or naturalization. But they are not considered citizens as a matter of identity, in that
they in no way represent the nation.
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1592 (2002); see also Susan
M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 299 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032-37
(2004) (finding neither the regime of war nor crime suitable for addressing terrorism); Steven W.
Becker, "Mirror,Mirror on the Wall... ": Assessing the Aftermath of September llth, 37 VAL.
U. L. REV. 563, 572-80 (2003) (criticizing the government's movement between domestic
criminal law and the law of war for enemy combatants, as an attempt to "have its cake and eat it
too"); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 954 (2002) (noting the double standard
inherent in John Walker Lindh being tried while the Guantinamo detainees receive no due
process).
45. This charge was ultimately somewhat settled by the MCA, but not entirely. While the
MCA provides process, it neither fully provides the constitutional protections U.S. citizens receive
in criminal courts nor the protections that prisoners of war receive when tried for war crimes by
regularly constituted military tribunals like courts-martial. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn,
Questioning the JurisdictionalMoorings of the Military Commissions Act, 43 Tax. Irrr'L L.J. 29,
32 (2007) (noting that use of coerced self-incriminating statements are permitted); id. at 36-38
(describing overreaching in establishing regulatory definitions of substantive offenses and
contrasting with analogous offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
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criminals, with all attendant rights due a criminal defendant, especially
where the suspected terrorist is a U.S. citizen.46
The "us-them" dialectic plays a prominent role in these measures
as well. The Executive chose to expressly promote such a regime when
it excluded U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the military commissions as contemplated by presidential order.4 7 It is also clear that, at
times, the Executive has treated citizen-enemy combatants differently.
Yaser Hamdi, for example, was transferred from Guantarnamo to a
detention facility in the United States when evidence surfaced that he
was actually born in Louisiana and is therefore presumptively a U.S.
citizen.48
Because the new security measures deal so directly with the allocation of fundamental emergency powers among the three branches of
government and involve an express "us-them" categorization, they are
uniquely suited for the type of unified analysis that Professor Rubin
advanced. Focusing on the government's detention and trial of enemy
combatants, we aim to conduct such a unified analysis to identify common principles and clarify disagreements in the entrenched positions
now held by scholars from competing schools of thought.
Below in Part II.A, we introduce alternative rules concerning judicial review of post-September 11 actions of the Executive and Congress, especially with regard to noncitizens held abroad. In Part II.B, we
examine which of these rules have been given effect by the Court and
legislature to date. In Parts III.A and III.B, respectively, we introduce
and define our unified approach. In Part III.C, we review and analyze,
from a unified perspective, the judicial and legislative pronouncements
to date and the choices facing the Court in the next wave of cases. In
Part IV, we question the limitations involved in joining theoretical per46. See Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. JudicialProcess: American JudicialResponses
to the Government's War on Terror, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. Rav. 787, 821 (2003). See
generally Becker, supra note 44; David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human

Rights, 22 PHR. & PUB. POL'Y Q. 9 (2002).
47. See Cole, supra note 44, at 954-55. This choice certainly was not mandated by law. See
id. The military commissions reviewed by the Supreme Court in Quirin, for example, included a
defendant who was a U.S. citizen. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942). There, the Court
determined that even U.S. citizens could be subjected to military tribunals if they were found to be
enemy combatants. See id. at 37-38.
48. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). Also, separate from the question of
how the U.S. treats citizens designated as enemy combatants is the fact that the government
continues to provide trials to other citizens accused of terrorist activity. See Jennifer Medina,
Sailor Started E-Mail on Terror, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIAs, Mar. 9, 2007, at A18 (discussing the

arrest and federal charging of Hassan Abujihaad, a former U.S. Navy sailor accused of turning
over information related to the movement of his vessel to terrorist groups via e-mail); see also
John Christoffersen, Navy's Vulnerability Comes Out at Spy Trial, MtAMi

at A5 (same).
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spectives to undertake this type of inquiry, prior to providing our concluding thoughts in Part V.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The United States government's post-September 11 detentions of
aliens and citizens have sparked questions about the proper balance of
liberty and security in times of emergency4 9 and, in particular, the proper
role of the courts in striking this balance. This section explores the
tradeoff of liberty and security, alternatively using principles and values
supplied through the more traditional analytical frameworks of L&E and
CRT. Ultimately, we believe that these traditional arguments take place
in isolated theoretical spaces because they concern incommensurate values that cannot be directly traded off against each other." As a result,
neither approach is successful in moving the debate forward by suggesting a common dialogue that might incorporate methods from each
paradigm and spark a meaningful exchange of ideas on common ground.
Part III presents a unified analysis that aims to do so.
A.

Alternative Rules for JudicialReview
of Executive Actions Abroad

Setting aside for the moment statutory and constitutional constraints, we hypothesized four alternative rules for judicial review of
executive action in the detention cases. These alternative rules were
largely derived from the commentary and arguments about the detention
of aliens at Guantdnamo. The first rule was set forth in Johnson v.
Eisentrager: and admits of no judicial role in reviewing the detention
of aliens abroad. The Eisentragerrule correlates closely with the position taken by the government in litigation. 2 The three remaining alternative rules, de facto sovereignty, statutory jurisdiction, and
constitutional jurisdiction, would each allow for judicial review of
detentions at Guantinamo but have significantly different legal bases
49. See supra Part I.
50. In a recent text, Professors Posner and Vermeule have labeled these opposing view points
regarding our current state of emergency as the "deferential view" and the "civil libertarian view,"
where the former view requires courts to defer heavily to governmental acts and the latter
concerns itself with the extent of encroachment on individual rights. POSNER & VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 21, at 15-17.

51. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).

52. See infra notes 57-58. We are not the only commentators analyzing the terror cases by
paying specific attention to the importance of alternative-rule structures. For instance, others have
referred to what we call the Eisentragerrule as the "traditional approach." See Fallon, Jr. &
Meltzer, supra note 31, at 2055-56 (claiming that this approach would have found that only
Guant~.namo detainees with sufficient contacts to the U.S. could assert a constitutional right to file
a habeas petition).
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and institutional consequences. Without strictly distinguishing among
these three alternative rules, the petitioners in two detainee cases (Rasul
v. Bush53 and Al Odah v. United States54 ) argued for elements of each.
Most notably, the Rasul petitioners detailed the case for constitutional
jurisdiction,5 5 and the Al Odah petitioners focused on various forms of
statutory jurisdiction (through the habeas corpus statute as well as the
federal-question jurisdictional statute in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act).5 6
Under the Eisentragerrule, the legal regime differentiates not only
between alien and citizen, but it also further divides aliens into friends
and enemies as well as residents and nonresidents. On this view, Congress has not conferred upon the courts the statutory authority to review
U.S. detention of enemy aliens abroad, and neither does the Constitution
require it. As a result, the courts lack jurisdiction altogether to review
the detention of enemy aliens held outside United States sovereignty,
including at Guantinamo. Moreover, under the Eisentrager rule, the
quantum of de facto U.S. control is not relevant to the availability of
judicial review-detention must occur within formal U.S. sovereign ter-

ritory to fall within the jurisdiction of the courts.5

As articulated in

Eisentrager, this rule allows for the possibility that Congress might,
through legislative amendment to the habeas corpus statute, provide for

judicial review of such cases in the future.

8

Under the de facto sovereignty rule, the courts would be empowered, for the purpose of determining their own jurisdiction, to find de
facto sovereignty when the United States exercises a quantum of control

and jurisdiction over a geographic area. 59 As a result, under existing
53. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
54. 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
55. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 20-22, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03334) [hereinafter Rasul Petitioners' Brief].
56. Brief for Petitioners at 4, 13, 15, 21, Al Odah v. United States, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos.
03-334, 03-343) [hereinafter Al Odah Petitioners' Brief].
57. This is the rule advanced by the government in Rasul and Al Odah. See Brief for the
Respondents at 11, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) [hereinafter Rasul
Government Brief].
58. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79, 798 (1950). The Rasul Government
Brief suggested that Congress's power in this regard is limited and must respect the President's
commander-in-chief powers. Rasul Government Brief, supra note 57, at 42-46.
59. The petitioners in both Rasul and Al Odah argued for the availability of judicial review
under three theories without separating those rules into their distinct components: de facto
sovereignty, statutory jurisdiction, and constitutional jurisdiction. For the de facto sovereignty
view, see Rasul Petitioners' Brief, supra note 55, at 24-26; Al Odah Petitioners' Brief, supra note
56, at 16-18. The historical roots of the de facto sovereignty rule were articulated by a group of
professors of legal history:
The historical evidence set forth below suggests, however, that the common
law writ of habeas corpus, known to the Framers and incorporated into the
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statutory authority, the courts would acquire jurisdiction to review executive action against aliens in such locations. 6° The de facto sovereignty
rule, like the Eisentragerrule, allocates exclusive responsibility for true
extraterritorial detentions to the Executive. It differs in recognizing that
U.S. control, and the consequent exclusion of other sources of law,
should be recognized as sufficient to confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts.
Whether jurisdiction over areas of de facto sovereignty is based in the
Constitution or the habeas corpus statute, or both, would determine the
sources of substantive norms available in reviewing the detention.
The third alternative we postulated is a regime under which judicial
review of extraterritorial detention of aliens is never required by the
Constitution, but that it is authorized, and indeed required, by the habeas
statute enacted by Congress. 6 Under this legislative or statutory jurisdiction rule, the scope of statutory habeas (or review under the Administrative Procedure Act) exceeds the reach of the Constitution. This
means that, although aliens would be entitled to judicial review of their
detention, they cannot prevail without identifying and establishing a vio62
lation of an applicable substantive norm outside the U.S. Constitution.
The fourth rule, constitutional jurisdiction, views the U.S. Constitution-through its Due Process and Suspension Clauses-as mandating
judicial review of all detentions by the U.S. government regardless of
the nationality of the detainee or location of the detention. The constitutional-jurisdiction rule views the U.S. Constitution as providing for

"equal justice not for citizens alone, but for all persons coming within

Suspension Clause of the Constitution, would have been available to challenge the
"enemy" status of individuals detained in a territory, like Guantanamo, that has been
firmly under this country's exclusive jurisdiction and control for over a century.
Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of the Petitioners at 3, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
60. This is similar to the approach taken in U.S. territories where residents are accorded
fundamental constitutional rights. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922); Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215 (1903); Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901). These cases are collectively referred to as the "Insular
Cases." See The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REv. 94, 137 & n.269 (1957).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004) ("No party
questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians. Section 2241, by its terms,
requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to
hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base.") (citation omitted). The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, enacted subsequent to the
Rasul decision, modified § 2241 to foreclose the statutory jurisdiction rule. See Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(l), div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
62. Jordan J. Paust presents an optimistic view of the availability and applicability of
international-law norms that courts might apply in reviewing such detentions. Jordan J. Paust,
Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV.
Ir,'L

L.J. 503 (2003).
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the ambit of our power, ' 63 such that "our courts can exercise it whenever
any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we
govern."' Accordingly, the courts must have jurisdiction to review any
detention under color of U.S. authority-whether or not Congress has
sought to confer it upon the courts-and even if Congress has sought to
abridge it.6 5
Taken together, these four alternative rules-the Eisentragerrule,
the de facto sovereignty rule, the statutory jurisdiction rule, and the constitutional-jurisdiction rule-represent the wide range of alternative
rules for judicial involvement advanced by scholars in considering
post-September 11 security measures. By analyzing these rules, first
under the traditional approaches and then, in Part III, under the unified
approach, we seek to move the debate in a new direction-one that
shares common ground and is, we hope, more productive. The rules are
first considered, however, in light of the previously identified competing
schools of thought.
1.

THE CASE FOR LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS ABROAD: EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY

Law and economics scholars have traditionally approached comparative-institutional analysis by adopting the public-choice model of
democratic institutions. 6 6 Thus, the political members of the executive
and legislative branches are seen as self-interested reelection maximizers.67 As a result, the policies developed by the political branches are
seen as flowing from a legislative market of competing interest-group
campaigns, rather than the product of reasoned debate seeking to maximize the public good. 68 Under certain idealized circumstances, this legislative market might produce beneficial policies, but, because the
political branches are understood to be motivated by reelection rather
then directly concerned with maximizing public welfare, law-and-economics scholars have chosen to turn their attention to judges. 69
63. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 798.
65. The foundations of this view were relied upon by the Rasul petitioners and, to a lesser
extent, by the Al Odah petitioners. See Rasul Petitioners' Brief, supra note 55, at 17-23 (arguing
that a narrow interpretation of habeas jurisdiction would raise serious questions under both the
Due Process and Suspension Clauses of the U.S. Constitution); Al Odah Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 56, at 12.
66. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-13, 28-30 (1997).
67. See THE NEXT TwENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PU1BLIC CHOICE 4-7 (Charles K. Rowley et al.
eds., 1993).
68. Rubin, The New Legal Process, supra note 36, at 1398-99.
69. Id. at 1400.
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Judges, or at least federal judges, are seen by law and economics
scholars as rational actors in the pursuit of public welfare because the
judicial system removes most, if not all, possibility for a judge to gain
personally from his or her substantive rulings.7 0 As a result, only efficiency-driven principles remain as animating judges' decisions.7' Under
this view, Congress and the Executive are democratically legitimate, if
non-neutral, while judges are seen as neutral, if not democratically
grounded. This public-choice view of political actors, however, may not
be the best model for understanding actions of the Executive during
emergencies.
The government's myriad post-September 11 security actions fit
most comfortably within the "accommodation" view of the proper role
of the Constitution during emergencies:
The accommodation view is that the Constitution should be relaxed
or suspended during an emergency .... The reason for relaxing constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties
inherent in expansive executive power-the misuse of the power for
political gain-are justified by the national security benefits.7 2
In nonemergency situations, then, the U.S. Constitution strikes a
particular balance in protecting individual liberties, even at the risk of
lessened security, because the risk of misusing expansive executive
power outweighs any benefit from the resulting marginal gains in security. This default bias against expansive executive power might be particularly well conceived in reaction to the problem of crime control
where criminals, unlike terrorists, can be modeled as rational and self
70. Id. at 1399-1400; see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1-7 (1993). Within economic
theories, however, potential deficits are also assigned to judges as decisionmakers. See ADRIAN
VERMEULE,

JUDGING

UNDER

UNCERTAINTY:

AN

INSTITUTIONAL

THEORY

OF

LEGAL

INTERPRETATION 154-55 (2006) (asserting that judges suffer problems related to uncertainty and
bounded rationality-"limits on the information-process capacity of otherwise rational agents.").
71. Specifically, the original economic models take a demand-side approach. The supposed
efficiency of the common law occurs because inefficient decisions create losses to one party that
are higher than the gains to the other party, resulting in greater litigation pressure. For an
overview, see Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 Sup.
CT. ECON. REV. 19 (2005). More recently, this optimistic evolutionary account has been cast in
doubt in a number of articles that point out the potential of interest groups to organize litigation
efforts. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law,
23 J. LEG. STUD. 807 (1994) (examining the role of trial lawyers in the expansion of tort law).
72. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605,
606-07 (2003) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Accomodating Emergencies]. See also
Ackerman, supra note 44, at 1037-45 (advocating the creation of an emergency constitution
providing the government short-term crisis powers to respond to episodic terrorism). But see
Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801
(2004) (criticizing the concept of the emergency constitution and analyzing the dangers of treating
periods of emergency as subject to something other than ordinary constitutional law).
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interested such that increased investment in security efforts can be anticipated to deter criminals' pursuit of illegal enterprises.73 Under the
accommodation view, however, the existence of a true emergency justifies the reversal of the traditional rule. Under emergency conditions, the
security benefits to be gained by concentrating power in the Executive
are presumed to outweigh the risk of misusing power.7 4
The shift in this balance can be seen as reflecting two independent

conditions present during emergencies: (1) a decreased likelihood of
misusing power due to limitations on the scope of the emergency powers

sought-for example, geographical or temporal limits; 75 and (2) a
greatly increased benefit to marginal gains in security due to the presence of a grave and impending threat to national security.76 In such a
situation, it may be reasonable to dispense with public-choice theory's
pessimistic account of executive action and presume that such actions,

within prescribed limits, are taken for the common public good, such as
protecting national security during the emergency. In fact, the term
"emergency" might be theoretically defined (and bounded) as the set of
conditions under which the danger to national security is sufficiently
large and immediate that it overrides the traditional motivation of politi-

cal officials (re-election) and substitutes in its place the necessity of protecting the nation from attack.77
The government has argued the detention of enemy combatants at
Guantdinamo is justified by two well-established prerogatives of a nation

during armed conflict: (1) disabling the enemy from returning to the
battlefield while fighting persists; 78 and (2) gathering of critical intelli73. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Common Ground, Irreconcilable Differences, New
Directions: Economics and Sociology: The Prospectsfor an InterdisciplinaryDiscourse on Law,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 389, 402, 414-15 (crediting Gary S. Becker with the earliest such analysis).
74. See Posner & Vermeule, Accomodating Emergencies, supra note 72, at 607 (discussing
the accommodationist theory of emergency executive powers and stating its tenet that "[tihe
reason for relaxing constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties
inherent in expansive executive power-the misuse of the power for political gain-are justified
by the national security benefits"). Posner and Vermeule have more recently referred to this
balancing of security and liberty as the "tradeoff thesis." POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE, supra note 21, at 21.
75. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1021 (2003).
76. See id. at 1059 ("Constitutional limitations on governmental powers are not seen as fixed
and immutable [under the model of accommodation], but rather as designed to minimize the sum
of the costs of crime and the costs of crime prevention.").
77. Whether the attacks of September 11 created such a situation in the United States and, if
so, the duration and geographical extent of the emergency, are difficult questions. Nevertheless,
the theoretical construction of "emergency" in public-choice terminology is helpful.
78. This claim has been made by several executive actors including the then Secretary of
Defense:
During the course of this war effort, the United States has detained several hundred
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gence.79 Under its view, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager properly
ruled that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction to consider the detention of aliens
outside the United States because neither the Fifth Amendment nor the
habeas statute should be given extraterritorial application (except in the
case of U.S. citizens subject to domestic detention).8" In support of this
reading of Eisentrager,the government has recently argued that judicial
review of such detentions would undermine intelligence gathering; hamper the war effort; give comfort to our enemies; distract the military
from its combat efforts; create a perverse incentive to hold detainees
close to the hostilities to avoid judicial interference; contravene Congress's prerogative to set the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts and
fail to give proper effect to Congress's rejection of a proposed statutory
override of the Eisentragerdecision; expose the courts to an unmanageable flood of petitions; and ignore that such detentions are properly subject only to congressional oversight and diplomatic negotiation.8 1
The government's position constitutes what we described as the
Eisentrager rule. Under the Eisentrager rule, judicial review of the
detention of aliens abroad is not mandated by the Constitution and has
not been provided for by Congress. The government's argument relies
heavily on Eisentrageras binding precedent, but it is theoretically justifiable, assuming the existence of an emergency as defined above,
because under such conditions, the Executive's motivations are consistent with those of the polity: to secure the nation against attack.
As a result of the very real danger to national security that was only
fully appreciated after September 11, the marginal security gained by
holding suspected terrorists at Guantdinamo is far greater than we might
have previously understood. Moreover, if the Executive's asserted powers are limited in scope, although whether this is possible is the subject
of much debate,82 the potential for misuse of those powers is minimized.
enemy combatants. As has been the case in previous wars, the country that takes
prisoners generally decides that they would prefer them not to go back to the
battlefield. They detain those enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict.
They do so for the very simple reason, which I would have thought is obviousnamely to keep them from going right back and in this case killing more Americans

and conducting more terrorist acts.
Sec'y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Statement at Dep't of Defense News Briefing (Mar. 28,
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3380.
79. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 21-22

(2006) (describing the mosaic theory of intelligence, which requires numerous alleged terrorists
held in
80.
81.
82.

long-term detention to be interviewed repeatedly in order to succeed.)
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950).
Rasul Government Brief, supra note 57, at 42-47.
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 75, at 1089. Gross states the following:
The belief in our ability to separate emergency from normalcy,
counterterrorism measures from the ordinary set of legal norms, is misguided and
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These two dynamics alter the cost-benefit balance in favor of concentrating power in the Executive, including the power to detain and try suspected alien enemy combatants without judicial interference.
Such arguments have been criticized from at least two perspectives:
first, that "executive action is more likely to be worse during emergencies than during normal times,"83 and second, that such powers are likely
to spill beyond their purported limitations to noncitizens held abroad and
entrench themselves for long periods of time.8 4 Eric A. Posner and
Adrian Vermeule have attempted to expose the unproven, and some-

times inaccurate, assumptions that underlie these criticisms of the
accommodation view generally.85 They argue that the libertarian critiques of expansive executive powers rely on two sets of assumptionsone institutional and one psychological. The institutional assumption is

that emergencies work like "ratchets" in that constitutional protections
are not properly restored after each emergency, ultimately resulting in
too much security and too little liberty.86 The psychological assumptions collectively hold that executive and legislative decisionmakers are
unable to make rational decisions during emergencies and, therefore,
judges, who somehow can maintain their neutrality, are best suited to
balance liberty and security during emergencies.8 7 But Posner and

Vermeule argue that these libertarian assumptions simply do not support
the conclusion that judges are necessarily better suited to make such

judgments, either because they are subject to similar psychological phenomena (and potentially disadvantaged by a lack of information and
processing ability upon which to base decisions),88 and because the exisdangerous. It undermines our vigilance against excessive transgressions of human
rights and civil liberties. It focuses our attention on the immediate effects of
counterterrorism measures, while hiding from view their long-term costs. When
added to the inherent problems that times of crisis pose in striking an appropriate
balance between individual rights and national security needs, this militates against
our ability to make accurate calculations of the relevant costs and benefits with
respect to governmental emergency powers.
Id. (citation omitted).
83. Posner & Vermeule, Accomodating Emergencies, supra note 72, at 609; see also Gross,
supra note 75, at 1038-42, 1058-96 (finding that psychological phenomena such as the
availability heuristic, prospect theory, and myopic perspectives and the tendency to concentrate
the cost of new security measures on outsiders combine to cause the government to seek too much
security at the cost of liberty during emergencies); Tribe & Gudridge, supra note 72, at 1834-35
(criticizing reliance upon a unitary Executive during a time of crisis and describing as "the hardlearned lesson of our past" our understanding that "[p]recisely when our peril seems greatest, we
dare not entrust our fate to the judgment of any one individual, even though that individual be
elected by the whole People of the United States.").
84. See Gross, supra note 75, at 1073-96.
85. See generally Posner & Vermeule, Accomodating Emergencies, supra note 72.
86. Id. at 609.
87. Id. at 609-10.
88. See id. at 626-44.
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tence of institutional ratchets that disfavor liberty have not been empirically established.8 9 In fact, they argue, it is plausible that ratchets work
the opposite way-resulting in too much liberty at the expense of
security. 90
As a result, the Eisentragerrule, which represents an extreme version of judicial deference under the accommodation model, should be
evaluated as to whether the increased security it provides justifies its
cost in curtailed liberty. The other three alternatives-de facto sovereignty, statutory jurisdiction, and constitutional jurisdiction-would
each provide for judicial review of the detention of enemy combatants at
Guantinamo. The cost of judicial review under those rules includes loss
of intelligence due to disruption of interrogation, distraction of military
commanders from combat operations, and undermining of ongoing diplomatic negotiations. In addition, tremendous institutional costs would

be incurred if the judiciary were to erroneously order release of an al
Qaeda member-far more than what might be involved in releasing a
mere criminal.9"
Balanced against these costs, the increased liberty gained through
judicial review might be seen as negligible from the perspective of the

U.S. citizen. First, the detentions at Guantdinamo are restricted to noncitizens captured outside the United States. This means that no citizen
will be denied habeas review under the Eisentragerrule. In addition, a
resident alien detained within the United States would also be accorded

review. The impact of the Eisentragerrule is limited to those who have
not assumed the obligations of citizenship and have little connection to

the United States, except perhaps in their common desire to attack it.
Moreover, the government has demonstrated that such detentions are far
from arbitrary. The military has a robust review process that has already
resulted in the screening out of thousands, and diplomatic negotiations
89. Id. at 610-22.
90. Id. at 622-26.
91. In fact, such a mistake could be devastating for the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary
should it come to pass that a judicially released detainee later participates in a large-scale attack
within the United States. Unlike the executive or legislative branches, which can be held
politically accountable for such mistakes, the judiciary cannot. (Indeed, it is the judiciary's
insulation from political accountability that makes it suitable for such counter-majoritarian roles.)
But without political accountability, there is no "release valve" for public disagreement and anger.
This might be particularly acute in the case of the erroneous release of a terrorist because such an
action is qualitatively different than the erroneous release of a criminal-a concept that has gained
popular acceptance as the price of liberty. The increased costs of an erroneous release of a
terrorist, such as a mass casualty on the scale of the September 11 attacks, might create a popular
backlash that could, in the long run, result in greater damage to the judiciary than that which
critics argue might result from the Eisentrager rule's limitation on judicial review. In short, the
release of suspected terrorists might be properly classified as a political act that the judiciary is
simply ill-suited to undertake.
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have resulted in the release of hundreds.9 2
Finally, the Eisentragerrule respects Congress's role in providing
for the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. After Eisentrager was decided, a legislative proposal was introduced that was
intended to override Eisentragerwith an amendment to the habeas statute providing jurisdiction over the petitions of any person held by the

United States (or under color of U.S. authority) anywhere in the world,
alien or citizen alike.93 The amendment was not passed into law;9 4 however, the option for legislative override remains, such that the Eisentrager rule does not exclude Congress from the conversation.

2.

THE CASE FOR EXTENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO ALL DETENTIONS
BY THE

U.S.

GOVERNMENT: PROMOTING LEGITIMACY BY

PROVIDING A FORUM TO VOICE SOCIAL-JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

Pursuing equality is, for many of us, among the most noble and
important endeavors of a modem government and society. This
endeavor faces, however, a series of theoretical and practical challenges.
The theoretical challenges reflect deep philosophical disagreements
about what sort of equality should be pursued, and for whom.9 5 The
practical challenges revolve around questions about which legal and
political institutions are the most appropriate for providing egalitarian
92. See Rasul Government Brief, supra note 57, at 7. The government argued that
[t]he Guantanamo detentions already have been the subject of extensive
diplomatic discussions between the Executive and officials of the foreign
governments of detainees' home countries. To date, more than 90 detainees have
been released (or designated for release) from Guantanamo to foreign governments.
Id. For more up-to-date detainee adjudication numbers, see U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
DEFENSELINK NEWS TRANSCRIPT: ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE REvIEw BOARDS FOR ENEMY
COMBATANTS HELD AT GUANTANAMO ATrRIBUTABLE TO SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS (2007),

available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902.
As of
March 6, 2007, for the 328 detainees given hearings before Administrative Review Boards
("ARBs") in 2006, fifty-five had been transferred. Id. In 2005, there were 463 detainees who
were given hearings before ARBs, with fourteen being released and 119 being transferred. Id.
93. See H.R. 2812, 82d Cong. (1951).
94. See Rasul, Government Brief, supra note 57.
95. The proof of this claim and the U.S. Supreme Court's peripatetic approach to resolving
what measure of equality is to be guaranteed has produced widely disparate results throughout the
nation's history. For example, the Court's upholding the concept of "separate but equal" in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was premised upon providing "political" rather than "social"
equality. Not until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did the Court fully step
away from this stifled notion of equality. In between these two cases, the Court decided that
classifications premised upon race and national origin would be subject to strict scrutiny, but
found that such an analysis did not prevent the government from detaining U.S. citizens of
Japanese descent. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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justice," and how to implement effectively egalitarian social policy.9 7
CRT methodology is grounded upon an understanding that equality
and justice are not universally applied concepts. As three of the discipline's most prominent scholars have opined, law's claims to neutrality
and objectivity "are harmful fictions that obscure the normative
supremacy of whiteness in American law and society. 98 Essentially,
CRT scholars realize a large chasm often exists between the principles
of formal equality and the lived experience of outsiders. 99 The expanse
of that chasm has been demonstrated in governmental decisions on who
to detain or prosecute after September 11. Although perhaps unintended, in practice, the decisions certainly have implicated questions
about which persons should be protected from governmental coercion
and what branch of government should define the form and limits of the
coercive experience.
Placing to one side claims of deliberate malfeasance by government
actors, L&E doctrine suggests a world where governmental actions are
conceived and carried out by rational individuals who hold the concept
of the rule of law in high regard and attempt to use the most efficient
means to achieve government-directed goals. Or, as the public-choice
model infers, a world inhabited by legislative and executive actors who
are reelection maximizers-so while actions may be informed by political ideology, they must still consider how a decision will be received by
the polity." ° The problem is that the method works largely through a
cost-benefit analysis where equality and antisubordination never quite
measure up to the concerns against which they are being measured. On
this point Professor David Cole is instructive. In his critique of Judge
96. While it is the province of the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure the constitutionality of our
laws, at times, justices have acknowledged that the Court's decisions are still bound by its
prescribed role within a representative form of government. The following passage is instructive:
"Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic
society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore dependable, within narrow limits. Their
essential quality is detachment, founded on independence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
97. LESLEY A. JACOBS, PURSUING EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EGALITARIAN JUSTICE 3 (2004).
98. The scholars are Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., and Angela Harris. See A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 1.
99. By "outsider," we refer to the CRT concept of those invested with less social and political
capital than persons occupying dominant or majority groups. For instance, the phrase would
apply to those who are aliens versus citizens, persons of color versus white persons, female
instead of male, and members of the underclass rather than financially well-off. For a discussion

of how one's unacknowledged outsider status can be harmful see, e.g.,

JODY DAVID ARMOUR,

NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA

(1997);

STEPHANIE

M.

WILDMAN,

PRIVILEGE

REVEALED:

How

INVISIBLE

PREFERENCE

UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
100. See generally THE NEXT TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 67.
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Posner's L&E approach to executive decisions in the War on Terror, he
finds that when one sets the cost as a catastrophic terrorist attack, "constitutional rights and civil liberties are almost inevitably outweighed." '
The CRT approach does not mandate a finding of deliberate malfeasance on the part of government actors. The approach, however, does

require close scrutiny in situations where ostensibly neutral governmental decisions result in the socially disenfranchised bearing the greatest
burden of those decisions. The post-September 11 government flight
10 2
from civil liberties has certainly involved such a situation.
The detention cases raise a number of chilling and disparate equality concerns. For instance, the government has labeled the Guantdinamo
detainees captured on the battlefield as unlawful enemy combatants and
detained them outside of the United States. By these acts, the government has sought to effectively place these persons in a law-free space,
outside of both domestic constitutional review and the customary and

statutory international laws applying to prisoners of war. Moreover, the
government initially afforded federal criminal process to a citizen
labeled an unlawful enemy combatant and captured abroad,10 3 but not

others. At first, this decision seemed to signal the government's intent
to treat citizens different from noncitizens-or the legal significance of
nationality. That significance, however, was undermined by an earlier
decision to afford criminal process to a noncitizen captured in the United
States' 014 and subsequent ones to deny it to citizens. 105
101. David Cole, Book Review, The Poverty of Posner'sPragmatism:Balancing Away Liberty
After 9/11: Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1735, 1737 (2007); see also MICHAEL E. TiGAR, THINKING ABoUr TEPRROISM: THE THREAT
TO CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 164 (2007) (claiming that Posner
suggests that in times of emergency the courts should afford almost limitless power to the
Executive).
102. See, e.g., Ash 0. B[Ui, Scapegoating the Vulnerable: Preventive Detention of Immigrants
in America's "War on Terror," 38 STUDIES INLAW, POLrICs, AND SOCIETY 25 (2006) (criticizing
the United States' expanded use of civil immigration detentions, after September 11, as a means of
denying due process to mostly Arab and Muslim detainees); Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals:
Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 481, 482-83
(discussing the mistreatment of immigrants post-September 11 and suggesting an approach to the
problem that integrates the values of democracy and security.)
103. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002) (sentencing John Walker
Lindh, the "American Taliban").
104. At the time, this pertained to the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, alleged to have participated
in the September 11 terrorist attack. Ultimately, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to all charges, even
though he claimed not to have conspired with the other September 11 hijackers. Neil A. Lewis,
Moussaoui'sMove To Recant Guilty Plea Is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A19. He was
sentenced to life in prison on May 3, 2006. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term by Jury
Over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TLIES, May 4, 2006, at Al.
105. Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla are both U.S. citizens who were detained as enemy
combatants within the United States, and for whom the government maintained there should be no
judicial review of their cases. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004); Hamdi v.
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As others have noted, there may be rational explanations for these
varied decisions. For instance, one scholar has opined that Hamdi and
Padilla were not initially afforded criminal process because the Walker
Lindh and Moussaoui cases revealed that criminal prosecution could
inordinately sap federal resources and endanger intelligence collection. 0 6 At bottom, this is a efficiency argument-a claim that the government "simply can not or will not undertake the tremendous effort to
mount full scale prosecutions and discovery efforts in each of these
cases and the many more that are likely to occur."' 10 7 Another explanation would be that the government took some time to arrive at its ultimate opinion-that regardless of citizenship status or where one was
arrested, any persons attempting to commit terrorist acts who also fit the
definition of unlawful enemy combatants would be detained; 0 8 further,
that detention could be for an unspecified period and would not be subject to judicial review.10 9
As a discipline, CRT requires that we remain skeptical of the ways
that identity may inform the treatment and outcomes for outsiders subject to legal processes. Within the context of post-September 11 governmental decisions, there have been a number of identity categories in
play related to national origin, religion, alienage, and race. While the
government actors have not acknowledged the significance of these categories, their cases certainly reflect citizens typically receiving different
treatment than aliens. Superimposed over this obvious distinction is the
more problematic and subtle concern that perhaps persons perceived as
non-Arab and non-Muslim have also received different and preferential
treatment.
From the CRT perspective, the detention and prosecution decisions
reflect some overt concerns and some that are not as apparent. First,
there is the obvious issue of Walker Lindh, a white U.S. citizen
promptly receiving a trial, without a significant period of stateside
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509-10 (2004); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing the cases of Munaf and Omar, citizens being held and prosecuted as enemy
combatants abroad).
106. Kelly, supra note 46, at 788.
107. Id. at 798.
108. According to one scholar, the government's decisions with regard to detention and trial
are part of a still developing "new criminal process." See John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New
Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 766 (2007) ("[T]he 'war on terror' has
accelerated the development of a new criminal process and that this new process has increasingly
displaced traditional methods of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing people who have
engaged in conduct that is subject to criminal penalties-whether or not that conduct is considered
'terrorism."'). Parry further asserts, "indefinite detention and trial by military commission of
suspected terrorists as emblematic (but not exhaustive) of the new criminal process." Id. at 767.
109. This would explain the government's position in the Al Marri case discussed in supra
note 30 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:365

detention premised upon an enemy-combatant designation, and the full
measure of due process attendant in federal criminal cases, while many
other mostly Arab noncitizen detainees have not. A simple analysis of
race and citizenship, however, does not explain the difference. As we
have previously stated, other citizens have not been initially provided

the same option, l" ° while one Middle Eastern alien, Mr. Moussaoui, has.
The unrecognized significance of Mr. Walker Lindh's race perhaps
is that it provided majority society the ability to view him as a sympathetic criminal defendant. Part of the project of CRT has been to expose
race as a socially constructed idea' I1 and to identify the privileges whiteness bestows." 12 CRT would caution that there is both a social and legal
significance to Walker Lindh's identity. Socially, whiteness, unlike
other identity categories, does not carry the stereotypical societal stigma

that other racial categories face. 11 3 Quite to the contrary, race works in
Walker Lindh's favor, encouraging majority society to be more open to
his explanation of how he was involved and how he regretted his
involvement because he represents a familiar archetype. His race then
gives him a foothold, which facilitates airing the remainder of his narrative-that he was the product of a broken home, and he was led astray
while seeking spiritual enlightenment." 4 Essentially, even though he is
110. See supra notes 25-26, 105 and accompanying text.
11. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27 (1994) (noting that race, a
category of no biological import, permeates every facet of our lives within Amercian society and
"is constructed along cultural, political, and economic lines"); Angela Harris, Foreword, The
Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2 AFR-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 207, 214-17 (1995) (observing
that society treats race as an observable fact, which it relies upon even where the physical and
cultural significance of race is weak).
112. See supra note 98-99 and accompanying text; see also Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as
Property, in CRJmicAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED ThE MOVEMENT 276,

287 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
113. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, in PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES: THE Locic OF AMEICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 62-65 (Robert Post et al.

eds., 2001) (claiming traits and behaviors are ascribed to certain minority groups where all group
members are assumed to have the assigned characteristics, and then must reckon with false beliefs
leading to societal discrimination); see also Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1203 (1995) (asserting that once they are used to explain societal
differences, stereotypes become an engrained part of cognitive processes); Charles R. Lawrence
I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322 (1987) (noting that "a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination
is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
114. Katherine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The American in the Taliban; Regretful
Lindh Gets 20 Years in Taliban Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al (describing Walker Lindh's
fourteen-minute statement before his sentencing where he repudiates terrorism and indicates he
went abroad for religious studies and to end the suffering of Afghanis, not to fight against
America); Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The American Prisoner; U.S. Taliban Soldier
Says He Was Disillusionedbut FearedReprisals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at A9.
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an accused traitor, in a significant way he is familiar and therefore capa-

ble of engendering sympathy. His lawyer's and family's pleas for his
life in the media then resonate with a certain there-but-for-the-grace-ofGod-go-we (or-our-children) quality. "5 If he is stripped of due process,
there is a greater concern that others like him could be too. Socially,
majority society then has a stake in his being treated fairly by the legal
system. So even though "we" are all affected by the fear terrorism creates, "we" are most comfortable externalizing the costs of security to
1 16

"them."

Legally, race also matters because as CRT scholars have indicated,
judges and courts are not blind to the ways in which society constructs
and relies upon identity.' 7 While not necessarily by design, courts also

rely upon race and other identity factors within legal proceedings."

8

While Mr. Lindh's identity arguably provides an unacknowledged
advantage, the identities of other detainees may similarly operate to disadvantage them. After September 11, there has been a societal backlash
against those perceived as Arabic or Islamic." 9 Like other minority
115. See William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The American Prisoner; Defending, and
Recasting, an Unloved Client, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2001, at Al (recounting how Walker Lindh's
defense counsel released childhood photos of the accused and comments from his parents asking
America not to prejudge their son); see also Evelyn Nieves, A Nation Challenged: The American;
U.S. Detainee Sends Letter to Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B8 (discussing the letter that
Walker Lindh wrote to his parents apologizing for causing them grief).
116. See Cole, supra note 101, at 1735 ("History suggests that when democracies are captured
by fear, they react in predictably troubling ways, in particular by targeting the most vulnerable for
selective sacrifices that the majority would not likely be willing to endure if the sacrifices were
evenly distributed."). But cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic
Failure,92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1115 (2006) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Democratic Failure]
("But the concern that self-interested majorities will impose excessive costs on targeted minorities
is itself ambiguous. Virtually all laws, taken in isolation, harm a minority of the population
. . . .").

117. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Race, the Court, and America's Dialectic:
From Plessy Through Brown to Pitts and Jenkins, in MINDING THE LAW 246, 247 (2000)
(asserting that the construct of race serves the hegemonic purpose of empowering the in-group and
disempowering the constructed "other"); IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCnON OF RACE 112 (1996); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor,
and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 439-41 (1993) (arguing that race "is an incoherent fiction,"
which courts give effect to for the purpose of representing minorities as "the 'Other' ").
118. See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding:A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1845 (1994) (terming courts' use of
stereotypical beliefs about identity as unintentional reliance upon "pre-understanding"); Justin D.
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking and Misremembering, 57
DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) (reporting the findings of the author's empirical study, which found that
"[j]udges and jurors may unintentionally and automatically 'misremember' facts in racially biased
ways during all facets of the legal decisionmaking process"). One of us has also made this point
elsewhere. See Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the
Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 941, 958-62 (2006).
119. Akram & Johnson, supra note 43, at 299-300; Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law:
Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1265-67 (2004)
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groups before them, Arabs and Muslims have been subject to racial profiling 120 and severely draconian immigration regulations. 12 1 These gov-

ernmental actions work in concert with social attitudes, 122 which
presently have served to negatively define the identity of people perceived as Arabs. Worse still, beliefs related to perceived race (Arab/

Asian), nationality (alien), and religion (Muslim), have been conflated
23
into one extremely loaded, overarching identity-that of the terrorist.1
As one scholar has noted: "Just as Asian Americans have been 'raced' as

foreign, and from there as presumptively disloyal, Arab Americans and
Muslims have been 'raced' as 'terrorists': foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening." 124 This conflation means that even Arabs or Muslims who are citizens and loyal will be perceived as "other."
In much the same way that Walker Lindh's identity makes him
familiar, the identities of Arabs and Muslims render them foreign(arguing that after September 11, Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have been presumed to be
foreign and disloyal); Thomas W. Joo, PresumedDisloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference,
and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L REV. 1, 2
(2002) ("In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Arab, South Asian, and
Muslim Americans have borne the brunt of the presumptions of foreignness and disloyalty.").
120. See Stephen J. Ellmann, Changes in the Law Since 9/11: Racial Profiling and Terrorism,
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 675 (2002-2003) (noting that, prior to September 11, progress had been
made in eliminating the use of racial profiling against African Americans in the criminal context,
but since September I1 the tactic has been employed against Arab-looking individuals suspected
of terrorism); see also Liam Braber, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race
and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 452 (2002) ("Based on the theory that Arabs and
people of Middle Eastern ethnicity are disproportionately involved in the current terrorist threat,
investigations using racial classifications subject these groups to more intense scrutiny than other
ethnicities when they travel.") (citation omitted); Wing, supra note 39, at 718 (arguing that
post-September 11, in many contexts, Arabs and Muslims have been subjected to racial profiling,
much like Blacks within the context of traffic stops).
121. See Bdli, supra note 102; Cole, supra note 44, 959-65 (detailing the government's secret
detainment of many Arab immigrants without hearings after September 11). See generally Steven
W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its Consequences for
Latinas/os, 81 OR.L. REV. 1153 (2002) (linking the social construction of Arab immigrants after
September 11 to concerns for illegal aliens from Latin America).
122. For an analysis about governmental actions and individual attitudes working together to
define limitations on citizenship of Middle Easterners after September 11, see Volpp, supra note
43, at 1593-95; see also Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of lmmigrant
America, 7 MicH. J. RACE & L. 441, 443 (2002).
123. See Wing, supra note 39, at 722 ("The pan-ethnicity term 'Arab' and the religious
signifier 'Muslim' have been socially constructed as a synonymous 'race' in the United States.").
It is arguable that a similar type of conflation took place with regard to the concept of race,
nationality, and disloyalty, for Japanese internees during World War II. See, e.g., Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding a military decision to segregate and exclude
potentially disloyal citizens of Japanese ancestry from the military area during World War II).
Bizarrely, the Supreme Court found the detentions were not premised upon race, but on the
detainees belonging to a group the military determined were a war-time danger. Id.
124. Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 AsIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001) (citation omitted).
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whether they are, in fact, citizens or not. 125 In this way, the detainees at
Guantdinamo
are not different from Mr. Hamdi in the eyes of the majority.' 2 6 With regard to suspects in the War on Terror, there appear to be
only the two normative categories of "them" and "us,' 2 27 where racialized suspects are clearly not a part of "us." Societal attitudes such as
these serve as silent support for the government's policies, which disproportionately affect the socially marginalized.' 2' This combination of
harmful legal impact and social ostracism also undermines the credibility of the government's actions by discouraging the likelihood that "we"
might undertake the role of ensuring fairness for "them." Given this
social and legal environment, a grave legitimacy concern arises. If gov125. See Hing, supra note 122, at 442-43. Hing argues that,
[iun
contemplating this targeting of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian
Americans by private individuals and official government policies after September
11, a clear theme emerges. In spite of the fact that these people have been part of
the fabric of our country for some time, in the eyes of many, those among us of
Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian background are not real Americans.
Id.
126. Hamdi, although a U.S. citizen due to his birth in Louisiana, is quite clearly of Arabic
descent, as are many of those detained at Guantdnamo. In essence, the negative social
significance of his perceived race negates the sense of community that his actual citizenship
should provide. This type of assessment of the effects race and citizenship is even more
complicated for Mr. Padilla. While his U.S. citizenship his clear, his otherness is defined by his
alleged connection to foreign terrorists and perceptions that he may be an ethnic or racial minority
who is not of Middle Eastern descent. It is not clear that Mr. Padilla identifies as such, but his
name will suggest to some that he is Hispanic or Latino. To the extent he is even perceived as
belonging to a racial minority group with its own history of debilitating stereotypes, this may
further or differentially affect his ability to be regarded as sympathetic. For a discussion of how
names and accent can be used as proxies for minority group status that trigger negative treatment,
see Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being "RegardedAs"
Black and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev.
1283 (making this claim within the context of employment discrimination).
127. Others have noted the danger in this dichotomy:
First, there is the danger that extraordinary measures that are employed at present
against "them" will be turned against "us" in the future. This may happen for
several reasons. First, with time there may be a redefinition of the boundaries of the
relevant groups. Some who are today an integral part of the "us" group may find
themselves outside the redefined group tomorrow, leaving within its circumference
a smaller number of people....
A second and closely linked danger in relying on the us-versus-them discourse
relates to the possibility that the growing schism between "us" and "them" will
result not only in the alienation of different groups in the population, but in the
dehumanization of the outsider or consideration of him or her as inferior.
Gross, supra note 75, at 1085 (citation omitted).
128. Well-established law, however, has concluded that such a disparate impact, alone, does
not amount to discrimination that violates the Constitution. See generally Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 242-47 (1976) (holding, in a variety of contexts, that a facially neutral law may
only be found unconstitutional when one proves a discriminatory purpose on the part of
lawmakers); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279-81 (1987) (holding that empirical
proof of discriminatory impact in the administration of the Georgia death penalty did not render
the practice unconstitutional without proof of discriminatory intent by state actors).
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emmental regulations disproportionately and severely infringe upon the
rights of a small group of individuals, whose interests are deemed

neither akin to, nor worthy of protection by the majority, can this minority group be treated fairly? 129 Certainly, the government could opt for
actions and policies that provide more, rather than less, equality,1 30 but
what is its incentive to do so?
Given the unacknowledged manner that identity categories have
been both all over, yet absent, from the discussion of the government's
detention and prosecution decisions, the CRT approach would perhaps
caution that no branch of government is particularly well suited for truly
addressing the attendant equality concerns. Certainly, the Eisentrager
rule fails because it requires deference based on somewhat arbitrary factors related to citizenship and location. While this is arguably the preexisting status of the law, 131 would anyone argue that the rule is fair by
CRT's tenets, which embrace the provision of substantive, rather than
formal, equality to outsiders?
Essentially, the Eisentragerrule violates the notion that protection
of our common human rights should inform policy choices and that fundamental fairness, transparency of process, and respect of dignity are
universal principles that should extend to most suspects in all but the
most unique or extreme of cases. 132 The Court's perceived deference is
129. Some might suggest yes, but for the following ironic reason: "Whatever sense one
attaches to the idea, it is dubious that scapegoating increases during emergencies. Minorities
undoubtedly are scapegoated during emergencies, but they are during normal times as well, albeit
in less visible ways." Posner & Vermeule, Democratic Failure,supra note 116, at 1122.
130. Robert L. Hayman and Nancy Levit explain how the attitudes of lawmakers and society
work in concert to deprive equality for some:
This doctrinal critique is tied to a political and structural critique of the legal
system. The legislative arena will not cure racism. The American public, enchanted
with the notion of equality of opportunity, is willing to avert its gaze from the
inequality of results. Thus, the conservative stronghold in state legislatures has been
able to champion procedural equality while rolling back measures that move toward
real, substantive equality.
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Thinking CriticallyAbout Equality: Government Can Make
Us Equal, 4 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 67, 71-72 (2000).
131. See E1-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 763-64 (2003). In ElShifa, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims decided a dispute involving U.S. missile strikes on an
alleged chemical-weapons plant in Sudan by ruling that Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457
(Ct. Cl. 1953), provided for the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause to property located abroad and owned by a noncitizen, but the El-Shifa court dismissed the
case on military-necessity grounds. See El-Shifa, 55 Fed. Cl. at 763-64, 774.
132. Applying such principles in an even-handed manner after September 11, which ignores
detainee citizenship and location would implicate the progressive political perspective economist
Julianne Malveaux has described as "shared status"-our understanding that across race, class,
and nation, "a life is a life is a life." THE PARADOX OF LOVALTv: AN AfricAN AMEPICA
RESPONSE TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 186 (Julianne Malveaux & Regina Green eds., 2002). See
also Mario L. Barnes, But Some of[Them] Are Brave: Identity Performance,the Military, and the
Dangers of an IntegrationSuccess Story, 14 DugE J. GENDER L. AND POL'Y 693, 712-13 (2007)
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all the more startling given the nature and severity of the detentions. If
the Eisentrager rule were to apply unmodified in such circumstances,
the government would always have incentive to place detainees outside
133
of the United States for the purpose of avoiding judicial review.
While the de facto sovereignty and legislative-jurisdiction rules
present better options than complete judicial deference from a CRT perspective, each also presents problems. The CRT concerns with the legislative-jurisdiction rule will be more thoroughly covered later.' 34 The
option, however, is facially problematic in its failure to identify-absent
the availability of the U.S. Constitution-which (or whose) legal norms
will give substance to the rule. The de facto sovereignty rule is somewhat palatable because it recognizes that government should not be
given a pass on the review of extremely restrictive detentions because of
the status (alien) or location of the detainees. The rule, however,
presents two concerns. First, what is the amount of control the government must exercise for the rule to attach? As conceived, the rule would
leave it to courts to decide, which could result in an uneven application.
Second, there is some potential for courts to be affected by two unrecognized phenomena: (1) sympathy for the government's challenges to
ensure national security after September 11; and (2) the societal disdain
for the particular "outsider" group members being detained. In other
words, depending on the sympathy of jurists to the post-September 11
world, in effect, the de facto sovereignty rule could become the Eisentrager rule.
In accordance with CRT principles, addressing the types of socialjustice concerns raised by the detentions would require an acknowledgment of how the social construction of race, ethnicity, religion, and citizenship has bolstered the government's ostensibly neutral decisions.13 5
Even without such an acknowledgment, however, CRT proponents seek
to ensure substantive equality for the socially disempowered, and they
seek to interject the lived experiences or narratives of those most
affected into any debate. While this section has primarily focused on
detainees rights, there have been other casualties tied to the
post-September 11 detention and trial decisions. Once the second wave
of cases is decided, perhaps there will be space to speak of the other
(discussing Malveaux's concept of shared status within the context of the military's treatment of
minorities and asserting that when we ignore the concept, courts are empowered to reflect back to
society a position condoning the discrimination of marginalized populations).
133. For an analysis of why the government chose to locate detainees at Guant~namo Bay, see
Daniel F. McCallum, Why GTMO? (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
134. See infra Part III.C.
135. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 130, at 71 ("A principal doctrinal critique offered by
Critical Race Theory is its challenge to the objectivity of purportedly neutral legal rules.").
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injuries to persons and process that have been left in the wake of broad
136
exercises of executive power.
Of the rule options, only the constitutional rule promises the opportunity for real and uniformly applied equality. It is the only rule that
acknowledges that due process provisions should attach to detentions
and MCA-authorized tribunals. 137 Also, one of the popular CRT methods of empowering the legally marginalized is through using narrative
methodology to expose discrimination and illuminate how law often
fails to hear their voices.1 38 Presently, through governmental decisions
and judicial deference, the stories of the detainees have been largely
136. These casualties are myriad. One group that has been injured through an abuse of process
has been persons wrongly detained as "material witnesses" since September 11. See Ricardo J.
Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared": Reexamining Material Witness
Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 694 (2005)
(discussing the dubious constitutionality of the government holding individuals as "material
witnesses" and asserting after September 11). Professor Bascuas argues: "Because the
government used the material witness statute to arrest individuals against whom it had little or no
real evidence of wrongdoing, it is no surprise that the vast majority of the 'material witness'
detainees turned out to have no knowledge of terrorist activity whatsoever." Id. Another group of
affected individuals are those who challenged the actions of the executive branch as unlawful or
overreaching, through lawful but sacrificial means. See Navy JAG Resigns Over Torture Issue,
MILITARY.COM, Dec. 27, 2007, http://www.military.comlNewsContent/0,13319,158983,00.html
(describing the story of Andrew Williams, a former naval officer in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps who resigned in response to waterboarding being used against al Qaeda operatives); see
also Tim Golden, Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2006, at A8 (reporting that Alberto Mora, the former Navy General Counsel, resigned after
repeatedly challenging the executive branch's position on coercive interrogation). Others might
be described as persons whose concern for treatment of the detainees caused them to engage in
unwise or unlawful acts. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Naming Names at GITMO, N.Y. TnIEs, Oct. 21,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 78 (describing the case of Navy Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz,
who was court-martialed and convicted on charges related to releasing the then classified list of
names of GuantAnamo Bay detainees to a progressive advocacy group). Finally, claims that
executive actions after September 11 have thwarted the rule of law are not new. With regard to
the detainees, there have been new claims related to a continuing lack of transparency around
detentions and the politicization of military commission decisions. See Carol Rosenberg,
'Platinum' Captives in Off-Limits Camp, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7, 2008, at A3 (discussing a special
unit at Guanttnamo Bay that is off limits to the media and houses high-value prisoners, who have
been requested but not authorized to testify in the trial of Salim Hamdan); Josh White, ExProsecutorAlleges Pentagon Plays Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2007, at A03 (discussing the
claims of a former Air Force Officer who resigned based on this belief that senior officials were
directing that due to their "strategic political value," prominent detainees receive trials before
cases that were more solid). For a particularly interesting account of how the trope of "enemy
combatant" has been used to destabilize any notion that just process is due, see Ariel Meyerstein,
The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299, 303-05 (2007).
137. See Neal Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 11 YALE L.J. 1259, 1298 (2002) (contending that distinctions made between alien and
citizen detainees violate the constitutional principles of equality and due process).
138. For an overview of the varied uses of narratives within feminist and CRT scholarship, see
DELGADO & SEFAcic,, supra note 39, at 38; Barnes, supra note 118, at 951-58; Hayman &
Levit, supra note 130, at 70 (discussing the work of seminal CRT scholar Richard Delgado and
noting that he "champion[ed] the value of narrative scholarship as a means of challenging
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silenced.' 39 Essentially, there is an absence of a counter-narrative about
the experience of being detained; of having a severely limited access to
counsel; and of receiving little to no due process. Certainly, of the

options of available to the detainees, only meaningful judicial review
holds promise for giving voice to their experiences.
B.

The First Wave of Detention Cases: Analyzing Which Rules
Informed the Decisions

The four potential rule structures we identified were originally conceived to consider the challenges of Guantinamo detainees. 4 ° Interestingly, each rule, was implicated by the Supreme Court's analysis in
these cases, although the analysis did not expressly consider the animating factors that are the subject of this article. In Rasul v. Bush, 4 ' the
Court explicitly rejected the extreme option presented by the Eisentrager rule. 4
Even though it indicated that foreign nationals held
abroad might enjoy some constitutional protections under certain cir-

cumstances,

43

the Court determined that the question of constitutional

jurisdiction was foreclosed.'
However, with regard to our other rule
choices, the Court viewed the other rules as jointly operative rather than
oppositional. According to the Court, the lower courts, which applied
Eisentrager to deny jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by aliens
held abroad, ignored the relevant nature of the custody and ignored the
received wisdom") (citation omitted); Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination,55
STAN. L. REv. 2365, 2378-81 (2003).
139. One scholar has described judicial deference as "the dominant narrative" in the
post-September 11 cases. Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency,
InstitutionalEquity, and ProcedureAfter September 11, 84 B.U. L. Rav. 383, 384 (2004) (noting
that "[t]he dominant narrative of deference, however, has both normative and descriptive flaws").
140. The cases of Jose Padilla and Yasir Hamdi were also pending when we developed this
project. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the father of a U.S. citizen who had been
detained as an enemy combatant after being captured in Afghanistan challenged the President's
ability to detain his son. See id. at 507. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) involved a
similar challenge of an enemy-combatant detention by a citizen, with the major difference being
that he was arrested within the United States. Id. at 456. These cases are not discussed within this
section because although they involved issues related to the extent of executive power available to
prosecute the War on Terror, they did not implicate the precise tradeoffs involved in cases where
the petitioners were noncitizens and detained abroad. Still, the governmental actions within these
cases are discussed below, where we consider our unified approach and its concerns for providing
citizen and noncitizen enemy combatants varying forms of process and access to courts. See infra
Part ILI.A-B.
141. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
142. Id. at 484-85.
143. Id. at 484 n.15 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990)
(Kennedy J., concurring)).
144. Id. at 478 (stating that after Eisentrager,Congress created the habeas statute, which meant
that "any federal district court no longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of their right
to federal habeas review").
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considerations we identify as arising from statutory jurisdiction and to a
45
lesser extent, de facto sovereignty.1
With regard to statutory jurisdiction, the Court found that Congress
had granted jurisdiction to federal courts to hear applications of habeas
corpus by "any person" who claims to be held "in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."' 4 6 The Court
also recognized that Congress had not strictly limited application of the
habeas statute to citizens within the United States.' 4 7 Ultimately, the
Court endorsed a version of the statutory rule by recognizing the limits
of Eisentrager and considerations related to de facto control.' 4 8 After
identifying the general applicability of the habeas statute, the Court
determined that the decisions in Eisentragerand its progeny, which gave
little attention to the statutory question, were limited to their facts and
history.' 49 Further, the Court found that whatever the traditionally
understood limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction, given the level of control exercised by the U.S. government over the Guantinamo detentions,
neither a geographical nor a citizenship limit made sense. 150 The Court
located the availability of expansive habeas relief within the common
law, where habeas extended not only to citizens, but also to "claims of
persons detained in the so-called 'exempt jurisdictions."""' In essence,
by balancing statutory and de facto sovereignty or control concerns, the
Court determined that it was the custodian and the nature of the custody,
52
rather than the location and status of the detained, that mattered.
Although Hamdan v. Rumsfeld' 53 was not pending before the Court
when we initiated this project, the issues in Hamdan pertain to what
recourse would be available to challenge executive decisions about the
rights of noncitizen enemy combatants held abroad. Specifically, the
plaintiff in Hamdan challenged the President's power to order noncitizens designated as enemy combatants to be tried by military tribunals,
subject to a set of rules and procedures created by the Executive. 154
145. See id. at 476.
146. Id. at 473 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000)).
147. See id. at 479.
148. See id. at 479-84.
149. Id. at 484 ("Eisentrager itself erects no bar to the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction
over the petitioners' habeas corpus claims.").
150. See id. at 468.
151. Id. at 481-82. Cf Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 2058-59 (suggesting that reliance
upon this common-law model had left open the question whether statutory habeas jurisdiction
would be open to extraterritorial aliens other than those being detained at Guantdnamo).
152. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84.
153. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
154. Specifically, the Court concerned itself with the rules governing commissions that were
convened "incident to the conduct of war." Id. at 2776 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
28-29 (1942)).
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While the detainee cases principally examined whether the Court had
jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges; that question is not the central
inquiry in Hamdan. Instead, Hamdan concerns whether the military
commissions that the President created had jurisdiction to try him. Still,
our various rule choices are germane to Hamdan.
Given that Hamdan was decided after Rasul, it would seem logical
that the Court would no longer need to address whether Eisentragerprevented the petitioner from reaching the Court. In place of a jurisprudential limit, however, Congress had passed the Detainee Treatment Act
("DTA"), 1 ' which contained a provision that stripped federal courts of
jurisdiction over detainee matters.' 5 6 Rather than determine the general
constitutionality of the DTA, the Court held that the statute could not be
used to strip jurisdiction from a case that was already pending when the
15 7
statute was enacted.
To answer the substance of Hamdan's claim, the Court again
appeared to rely upon a combination of the types of rules we suggested
were available. With regard to a statutory analysis, the Court looked. 58
to U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions 159 and the Uniformed
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). 16 ° The UCMJ presented problems
for the Executive because it proscribed conditions for the use of military
commissions, which included compliance with the rest of the UCMJ, the
laws of war, and the Geneva Conventions. 16 The Court found that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention required that detainees be
tried by "a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'' 62
Moreover, the specific crime Hamdan was charged with, conspiracy, did
not appear in any of the major treaties on the law of war. 1 63 Given these
anomalies of the Executive-directed commissions, the Hamdan plurality
found that the military commission convened to try him lacked

jurisdiction. 164
155. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
156. See id. § 1005(e).
157. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764.

158. See id. at 2786.
159. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
160. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
161. See Haidan, 126 S.Ct. at 2786.
162. Id. at 2795 (citing Geneva Conventions, supra note 159, art.3, § l(d)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
163. Id. at 2780-81. This was critical because jurisdiction for military tribunals created
incident to the conduct of war was limited to "offenses cognizable during time of war." Id. at
2776.
164. Id.
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Although statutory analysis was most prominent in its approach,
the Court also considered the constitutionally distinct duties and the separation of power between the branches. 16 5 This analysis did not directly
implicate our constitutional-jurisdiction model because it did not locate
within the Constitution a right for Mr. Hamdan to receive the same treatment or process as U.S. citizens charged in the War on Terror. It did,
however, examine whether the President's commission order intrudes
upon power belonging to the Congress. Hence, the UCMJ discussion
above implicates Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 166 because
commissions that fail to comply with limits set by statutes thwart congressional authority. Additionally, given that the Court found that the
AUMF was not a specific authorization for the President's commissions,
it used the decision in Ex parte Quirin167 to determine that the President
did not possess the robust power to direct commissions when and how
he saw fit. 1 68 Rather, the Court found that the power remained with
Congress and had to be specifically provided to the President.' 69 Again,
to the extent that this analysis forecloses jurisdiction for commissions
unless they respect limits on the Executive's power to legislate, it can be
arguably described as a form of a constitutional rule, albeit less so than a
rule premised upon equal application of constitutional protections.
In some ways the first wave of detainee rights cases did precisely
what we expected they would do: They chose from among various possible rule formations to settle some questions about the limits of executive action. What they did not do is articulate a preferred method for
managing concerns that arise at the intersection of power and individualrights conflicts. 1 70 Certainly, they neither announced a preferred rule in
terms of balancing efficiency concerns against social justice, nor did
they more generally reach the merits about precisely when constitutional
protections should be available to noncitizens held abroad. 1 7 ' In the
next part, we propose both how such a method would work generally,
165. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 2049 (making the same claim about Justice

Stevens' opinion).
166. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
167. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
168. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.

169. See id. at 2775, 2786.
170. Only the Hamdi decision came close to such an analysis when it suggested that under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Hamdi was entitled to a process that balanced the
government's interest against the potential deprivation of a constitutional right. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004). The problem with the detainee cases of extraterritorial
aliens is that the Court never considered in depth whether those constitutional protections
extended to such aliens.
171. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 2048 ("[T]he Court left unclear whether its
jurisdictional ruling extended more broadly to detentions of aliens throughout the world. Nor did
the Court determine what substantive rights the Guantanamo petitioners might possess.").
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and we specifically apply this method to the pending detainee cases after
Hamdan.
III.
A.

THE UNIFIED APPROACH

Theoretical Underpinnings of a Unified Approach

Legal scholars have historically explored the consequential effects
of a particular legal rule on subsequent behavior. Through this inquiry,
they have sought to discover or create rules that lead to behavior reflective of their preferred values: efficiency for law and economics scholars,
and social justice or antisubordination for CRT scholars. Each school
has focused overwhelmingly on the role of the judiciary in fostering
their preferred norms. Moreover, the two schools have rarely engaged
in a constructive interchange of ideas.' 7 2 Although undertaking complex
analysis of alternate rules within the context of law, this scholarship has
largely ignored the subtle differences among those who are to be sub17 3
jected to their notional rules: individual actors.
172. Quite to the contrary, there have been significant attacks and responses between the
camps. L&E proponents have been particularly critical of CRT scholars and methodology. See
generally Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories supra note 36. Prior to taking on CRT scholarship,
Daniel Farber had written in L&E. See Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modem Economic
Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 303 (1983). For additional commentary, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 368-84 (1995) (criticizing proponents of the CRT and narrative methodology,
most notably Patricia Williams); Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law: Are Radical Multiculturalists
Poisoning Young Legal Minds?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 46 (praising the Farber and Sherry
critique of CRT); Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40
(accusing CRT of having an "ugly streak" and claiming that rather than employing logical
arguments or empirical data, "critical race theorists tell stories"). For responses, see Culp, To the
Bone, supra note 36, at 1659-61 (taking Posner to task for his critique of CRT and alleging that
his conduct in the debate can be perceived as racist); Clark Freshman, Book Review, Were
PatriciaWilliams and Ronald Dworkin Separatedat Birth? Overcoming Law, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1568 (1995) (raising concerns with Posner's critique of the work of feminist and CRT scholars);
Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 796
(1999) ("[Clritiques of critical theories ... share ... a tendency to caricature feminist, gay, and
critical race theory, and to preempt the possibility of public dialogue. These critiques-the
methods of criticism-suggest a breakdown in the civility of academic discourse and an
extraordinary tolerance of intolerance."); David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven
Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1996) (severely criticizing Richard
Posner's OVERCOMING LAW and his analysis of CLS, CRT, and narrative).
173. Only in the recent emergence of CRT and socio-legal scholarship have we seen more
particular attention being given to the legally disempowered and the constitutive process inherent
in legal procedures. See, e.g., KRISTN BUMILLER, THE CIvIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988) (analyzing the impact of civil-rights law on victims of

discrimination);

PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES

FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (analyzing the manner in which subjects behave in legal settings and
import legal concepts into everyday life); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margin:
Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991) (arguing law and legal processes have ignored how diversity within identity categories
matters to human experiences).
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More recently, legal scholars have recognized that law's influences
cannot be accurately predicted absent an understanding of the individual.
Although many scholars have debated the merits of efficiency as an ultimate normative goal, a more basic component of this critique counsels
that an individual's social and cultural identities might derail the effort
to predict consequential effects in the first instance.174 Accordingly,
some members of subordinated populations who are subject to legal
processes find themselves fighting the process as well as the debilitating

social condition, which affects them.175
Law enjoys a similarly complex, although largely ignored, relationship with institutional behavior, particularly governmental action. Lawyers and legal norms have been elevated to exalted positions within
institutions of government. As a result, legal norms often shape governmental actions in ways that are entirely outside the sphere of the courts.
In turn, the path of governmental action further influences judicial decisionmaking. In a sense, governmental action and some personal behav-

ior enjoy an inverse relationship to law and legal consciousness.
Although the influence is not always apparent, interpretation and manipulation of the rule of law largely support governmental decisions. 17 6 For
individuals, especially marginalized individuals, legal rules may be
clear, but how law is understood, internalized, and used to modify
174. See Ellickson, supra note 40 (arguing that L&E could be enhanced by including doctrinal
tools from sociology and psychology); see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 73, at 389. As one
critical legal scholar has opined:
Critical scholars and practitioners are now engaged in a search for alternative
theoretical and practical approaches to working for and with clients whose different
perspectives, needs, and values do not fit neatly into traditional conceptions of legal
process and doctrine. Critical theory questions the authority of definitional limits
that are revealed by the context of real experience, a context often rendered invisible
by the bounds of legal discourse.
Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives:The Critical Practiceand Theory of Receiving
and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 864 (1992); see also Naomi Mezey, Out of
the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture and the Commonplace, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145 (2001);
Austin Sarat & Jonathon Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: CulturalAnalysis, Cultural Studies, and
the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 25 (2001).
175. See

JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,

RESISTANCE, AND

THE

Lirrs OF PRIVACY 13 (2001); see also Austin Sarat,". . . The Law Is All Over": Power,

Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor,2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 350-51
(1990) (analyzing the power law wields in the lives of the welfare poor). See generally Lucie E.
White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (exposing the imposing and unwelcome influence the law exerts in
the life of a woman on welfare).
176. Recently, at least one theorist has cogently posed the question of whether the judiciary has
become an instrumentalist organism or body captured by ideology and wielding the rule of law as
a means to an end. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF

LAW 172-85 (2006).
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behavior is anything but clear.' 7 7
It is within this legal landscape that we wish to explore a set of
alternative rules governing extraterritorial governmental action against
noncitizens. Using varied disciplines but Rubin's unified approach, we
attempt to flesh out the following issues: What responsibilities should be
assigned the three branches of government for overseeing such practices? What are the relative competencies of each institution in fostering
the norms of efficiency and social justice? Which institutions are best
able to adapt its practices for future cases? How do the institutions
interact when responsibility is assigned to another? What factors animate the choice between imposing the burden of legislative inertia on a
disenfranchised and disempowered group as opposed to the President or
the military?' 7 8 What is the institutional-individual relationship that has
given rise to this choice of governmental action? Has law unwittingly
relied upon stereotypes and misguided notions of identity to shape this
governmental action? Are other rules available that would foster a more
attractive efficiency-social justice tradeoff?
B.

Applying a Unified Approach: Trading off Alternative Rules'
Responsiveness to Efficiency and Social-Justice Concerns

In Part II, we presented two methodologies for approaching alternative rules pertaining to judicial review of extraterritorial governmental
action against aliens. The two analyses, however, did not engage each
other. They took place in different theoretical spaces and were grounded
in incommensurate values, efficiency, and social justice. The first analysis, grounded in law and economics, suggested that, during emergencies, a rule eliminating judicial review of executive actions taken against
aliens abroad might be justified by a cost-benefit analysis of security and
civil liberty. The second analysis, grounded in CRT, suggested that,
absent a constitutional guarantee of judicial review, any rule might be
unable to deliver an acceptable level of social justice and therefore, lack
legitimacy. Moreover, although we located the genesis of these various
rules in the arguments of the first wave of cases, in deciding those cases,
the Court gave us limited insight into why one rule was preferred over
another.
In this part, we seek to apply the unified approach developed by
Rubin and, in doing so, develop a theoretical space in which the com177. See EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 173, at 45-49 (analyzing the myriad ways that legal
norms are internalized and how individuals evince a shifting and multifaceted legal consciousness
that moves between submitting to, gaming, and resisting legal processes).
178. This balancing equation is not new. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
218-19 (1944) (deciding that Japanese internees, rather than the military and government, should
bear the burden of societal concerns about loyalty).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:365

posite functions of efficiency and social justice under alternative rules
might be compared directly. Our aim is to demonstrate that such a unified approach might permit a productive exchange of discourse between
the two divergent approaches to these issues.
Rubin suggested that a unified approach should extend beyond
7 9 or social justice., 81
examining the best rule for fostering efficiency
Moreover, it should seek to identify rules that assign responsibilities to
institutions that can best adapt their practices to foster these values in
future cases with an awareness of how institutions react when responsibilities are assigned to each other.' 8 ' In this regard, the four alternative
rules can be seen in a new light: How adaptive is each to future developments, and how does each perform in relation to coordinate institutions?
The Eisentragerrule is grounded in the idea that neither the Constitution nor any legislative enactment provides judicial review over aliens
held abroad. Under the Eisentrager rule, in which the detentions at
Guant6.namo are entirely within the Executive's prerogative, the judiciary is completely removed from the conversation regarding legality of
extraterritorial executive action involving aliens. The Eisentrager rule,
however, allows for the possibility of legislative overrule. In other
words, Congress could bring the judiciary back into the conversation by
182
amending the habeas corpus statute.
The de facto sovereignty rule invites the judiciary into the conversation but does so in a way that is more final: Congress could not easily
undo a finding by the Court that Guant6.namo was effectively within the
United States. This approach also suffers from being an unclear rule.
Future cases would likely involve fact-based determinations about the
179. See supra Part II.A.1.
180. See supra Part II.A.2.
181. See Rubin, The New Legal Process, supra note 36, at 1429-31.
182. Justice Scalia at oral argument in Rasul, suggested that such a rule is preferable to the
judicial extension of the habeas statute because Congress is better suited than the judiciary at
weighing the various policy considerations involved in the exercise of jurisdiction over such
cases:
Can we hold hearings to determine the problems that are bothering you? I mean, we
have to take your word for what the problems are. We can't call witnesses and see
what the real problems are, can we, in creating this new substantive rule that we are
going to let the courts create. Congress could do all that, though, couldn't it?
If [Congress] wanted to change the Habeas Statute, it could make all sorts of refined
modifications.
About issues that we know nothing whatever about, because we have only lawyers
before us. We have no witnesses. We have no cross-examination, we have no
investigative staff. And we should be the ones, Justice Breyer suggests, to draw up
this reticulated system to preserve our military from intervention by the courts.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
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nature and extent of U.S. control over various military bases around the
world and would beg the question under what other circumstances might
the courts similarly find that the U.S. exercises de facto sovereignty?
Such a regime is unlikely to satisfy either the proponent of more security
or more freedom. The proponent of more security recognizes that government lawyers, conservative by nature, will likely treat all locations
under the worst-case scenario: that the courts might declare that de facto
sovereignty exists. Thus, for the government lawyer, the de facto sovereignty rule might reduce, in practice, to the equivalent of the statutory
habeas rule (or perhaps even the constitutional rule, if the courts later
decide to extend the de facto sovereignty concept to the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment). This is an example in which the Executive's
conservative implementation of an unclear rule could supplant the
courts' role in future cases.
As explained above,' 8 3 the libertarian (or CRT scholar) might view
the de facto sovereignty rule as no better than the Eisentragerrule and
abridge judicial review in most places, given the possibility that the
future courts will allow the "otherness" of the petitioners to spill over
into their evaluation of the jurisdictional question. Moreover, there is
the possibility that the government will simply continue searching for
the right place that is truly beyond the reach of the courts and, once
found, concentrate future detentions there. Thus, both groups, for different reasons, might reject the de facto sovereignty rule for its lack of
clarity and uncertain application in future cases.
The legislative or statutory-jurisdiction rule is grounded in the idea
that the current habeas statute has conferred such jurisdiction on the
courts. 184 Like the Eisentrager rule, the statutory-jurisdiction rule has
183. See supra Part II.A.2.
184. This idea is plausible but has a complicated history. In short, as Justice Stevens pointedly
noted during oral argument in Rasul v. Bush, Eisentragerwas decided at a time when the law was
different. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (03-334, 03-343), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003 03_334/argument ("No, but Ahrens v. Clark
was the law at the time of that decision, and it was subsequently overruled. So that that case was
decided when the legal climate was different than has been since Ahrens against Clark was
overruled."). The Court's decision in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) permitted habeas
jurisdiction only when the petitioner was detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
hearing the petition. Id. at 190. But, according to Justice Stevens, the Court later overruled that
decision in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). As a result, in
Justice Stevens's eyes, the statutory-jurisdiction rule is at least as plausible as the Eisentragerrule.
Moreover, such a reading would comport with the fact that the courts have routinely exercised
jurisdiction over petitions brought by U.S. citizens held outside the United States. Under
Eisentrager, those cases can only be explained as the exercise of jurisdiction directly under the

Constitution, an explanation that assumes Congress drafted the habeas statute in an
unconstitutionally narrow manner.
Justice Stevens' involvement in this issue dates back decades to his clerkship for Justice
Rutlege during the term in which the Court decided Ahrens. See Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk
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the virtue of flexibility in institutional discourse and leaves open the
possibility of adaptation to future value judgments. Congress enjoys the
ability to legislatively overrule the statutory-jurisdiction rule, if it
deemed such action necessary. The two rules differ dramatically, however, in that they place the burden of legislative inaction on different
institutional actors. Under the Eisentrager rule, the default is no jurisdiction, whereas under the statutory-jurisdiction rule the default position
is that jurisdiction exists. As a result, under the first rule, congressional
inaction is a barrier to review, and under the latter it would entrench
judicial review. Thus, from this perspective, the Eisentragerand statutory-jurisdiction rules are equally adaptable, but vary in how they allocate the burden of legislative inaction. Both rules permit Congress to
weigh the policy considerations and provide a different solution,
although Justice Scalia appeared to ascribe this virtue only to the Eisentragerrule. Also, in contrast to the de facto sovereignty rule, both rules
clearly permit the government to develop concrete plans in reliance on
the rule and permit libertarians to accurately assess the danger to social
justice. Because both are rules of statutory interpretation, they permit
further debate and analysis within a coordinate branch of government.
The two rules differ dramatically, however, in their anticipated
adaptability to future efficiency and social-justice concerns. In this
regard, the statutory-jurisdiction rule seems to invite legislative consideration whereas reaction to the Eisentrager rule is far less likely to
mobilize legislative action. This observation, taken alone, is not necessarily helpful. For it is also likely that an extremely poor decision by the
Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens' Influence from World War II to the War on Terror,
92 VA. L. REv. 501, 504-06 (2006). The Ahrens Court (in an opinion authored by Justice
Douglas) rejected Justice Rutledge's competing view of the statute, articulated in his dissent, that
habeas jurisdiction turned on the presence in the Court's territorial jurisdiction a respondent with
authority to release the petitioner. Id. at 203-04 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The district court in
Eisentragersummarily dismissed, in reliance on Ahrens, because the petitioners, who were held in
Germany, were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767, 790 (1950). The Court of Appeals
reversed, noting that the Supreme Court in Ahrens had purported to reserve judgment on the case
at bar, in which the petitioner was held outside the country, and therefore, beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any U.S. court. See id. The Court of Appeals, relying on Justice Rutledge's
rationale, which was rejected in Eisentrager,found that the Constitution demanded the availability
of habeas review and, as a result, the statute should be construed to permit it. See Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-67 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Supreme Court reversed. Eisentrager,339
U.S. at 790. The Court first purported to adhere to the Ahrens rationale-that habeas jurisdiction
is unavailable because the petitioners were held outside the United States-but the Court then
proceeded to address the merits and conclude that the writ should not issue. See id. Finally, in
1973, in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, author of Ahrens, the Court adopted the rationale
for habeas jurisdiction that was espoused in Justice Rutledge's dissent in Ahrens, relied upon by
the D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager,and reversed by the Supreme Court in Eisentrager. See Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
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Court-one that misinterpreted Congress's clear intent or resulted in
large social costs-would be likely to mobilize legislative action. We
do not mean to suggest that courts should make bad decisions with the
intent of sparking public interest or mobilizing the legislative process.
But here we are assuming two rules that, as discussed previously,1 85 are
both viable interpretations of congressional intent.
Our analysis here runs deeper. Assuming a polity equally divided
on the issue, we posit that the executive branch might be in a better
position to initiate legislative action in reaction to the statutory-jurisdiction rule than the alien detainees and their sympathizers. In other words,
the two competing rules present alternative options for assigning the
burden of legislative inertia in relation to the habeas corpus statute.
Consider again the Eisentrager rule: no jurisdiction over aliens
detained abroad unless Congress acts. This rule is clear, not intrusive,
and, as a result, extremely efficient vis-A-vis executive action. But is the
Eisentragerrule adaptable to social-justice concerns?
Keep in mind the political position of those most affected-aliens
detained abroad by the United States. It is highly unlikely that such
people could mobilize political support within the United States to effect
a change in the Eisentragerrule. Indeed, aliens detained abroad might
be the most extreme case imaginable of a "discrete and insular minor'
and, therefore, unlikely to mobilone that is diffuse and remote
ity," 186
87
group.
interest
ize as a powerful
Consider on other hand, the statutory-jurisdiction rule, which establishes the default rule in favor of jurisdiction. As the Eisentrager rule
represented the most efficient rule, the statutory-jurisdiction rule appears
to be most adaptive to social-justice concerns. The judiciary is uniquely
suited to review individual cases and guard against the potential of the
development of a tyranny of the majority in a democracy. 88 The specter of judicial review of all U.S. detentions abroad, and particularly military detentions, suggests that efficiency will suffer.' 89 But is the
statutory-jurisdiction rule responsive to such efficiency concerns? It
would appear so. Congress has demonstrated that it is very responsive
to the military concerns of the President. It seems uncontroversial to
suggest that the military is better suited at effecting congressional enact185. See supra Part II.A.
186. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
187. See Gross, supra note 75, at 1019-23.
188. In this period just past the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), it is worth noting that that Supreme Court decision preceded, by at least ten years,
civil-rights legislative action by Congress and the society's preparedness for integration.
189. It should be noted that there is no principled way to distinguish, within the language of the
habeas statute, battlefield detentions from those taking place in more remote times and locations.
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ments to protect the efficiency of its operations than aliens detained
abroad might be in obtaining legislation responsive to their social-justice
concerns. 90 As such, the statutory-jurisdiction rule, in addition to
closely correlating to the actual statutory language, is most responsive in

that it appears to be most likely at initiating a responsive dialogue
among the three branches of government to arrive at the optimal
solution.
The constitutional-jurisdiction rule is very similar to the statutoryjurisdiction rule, but would be rigid and inflexible in its insistence that
the Constitution mandates such jurisdiction. Congress would then be
deprived of the ability to enter the dialogue in the future, except through
the unwieldy process of constitutional amendment. Moreover, this view
would seem to run against the trend of Supreme Court cases over the last

fifty years in refusing to apply constitutional provisions extraterritorially
and would likely, therefore, have significant unanticipated, and perhaps
unintended, consequences.
The statutory-jurisdiction rule would shift the normative framework
applicable to U.S. actions abroad and open a number of important questions to be addressed in the future, including what substantive norms
would apply under such circumstances. Under the statutory-jurisdiction
rule, the Fifth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially (except in
the case of citizens).1 9 1 As a result, it is not clear what substantive law
the detainees will have available on the merits of their petition. Several
possibilities include the Geneva Conventions,1 92 the Administrative Procedure Act, 9 3 the Alien Tort Statute, 94 enforcement of military regulations concerning detainees, and any future substantive enactments of
Congress dealing with detainee treatment. Thus, even without opening
the Fifth Amendment to extraterritorial application, these sources of substantive norms promise the possibility that the federal judiciary might,
through such habeas detentions, fulfill the grand vision of Justice Black
that the exercise of U.S. power throughout the world would recognize
190. Although arising in a different context, one of the earliest articulations of such an
approach to statutory interpretation was undertaken by Judge Guido Calabresi, a founder of the

L&E movement.

Gutoo CALABRESi,

A COMMON

LAW FOR THm AOE OF STATUTES

(1982). Judge

Calabresi argues that courts should be given, or should assume, the power to update obsolete
statutes by ruling in ways that shift the statutory "burden of inertia" to force the legislature to act
if it wishes to keep irrational laws. See id.
191. See supra note 169. The case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990), made the same determinations with regard to the applicability of the 4th Amendment to
citizens abroad. Both of these determinations may have to be revisited in the Munaf and Omar
cases, discussed in supra note 32.
192. See Geneva Convention, supra note 159.
193. Pub. L. No. 110-131, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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the common95dignity of humankind and afford equal treatment under the
1
laws to all.
C.

Looking Ahead Through a Unified Lens

More than three years after we began this project, the Court is faced
once again with fundamental questions about the role of the judiciary in
reviewing military detentions and the source and scope of substantive
norms to be applied. To fully appreciate the importance of the cases to
be decided this term, it is helpful to review the path that has returned
these questions to the Court.
In Rasul, the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and distinguished its own fifty-year-old precedent in
determining that federal courts have jurisdiction to review habeas petitions filed by aliens detained by the U.S. military at Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba.' 96 As discussed above, 197 the Court had several options for deciding the case: It could have found or denied jurisdiction on statutory
grounds; it could have required jurisdiction on constitutional grounds; it
could have found jurisdiction on quasi-constitutional grounds of de facto
sovereignty. Viewed from our unified perspective, the path chosenthat jurisdiction exists as a matter of statute-has both positive and negative effects. On the negative side, the statutory basis of the decision
provided no source of substantive norms for federal courts to apply in
conducting such a review. 198 Positive characteristics include that it
invited the political branches to engage in an important public dialogue
about the rights of such detainees and the roles of the branches of government in protecting them, including the proper role of the federal
courts. The Rasul decision also laid down a very clear rule concerning
the role of the federal judiciary: Jurisdiction exists over petitions filed by
any person held by a U.S. official and does not rely on any fuzzy standards such as the degree of U.S. control over the territory."'
But affirmance of Eisentragerwould have also laid down a clear
and predictable rule flexible enough to permit subsequent amendment by
the political branches. The unified perspective distinguishes these rules
by examining the allocation of the burden of legislative inertia. The
Rasul decision placed the burden squarely on the government rather than
the detainees as would have been the case had the Court affirmed on
Eisentragergrounds. As a result of the government's greater power to
195. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791-98 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
196. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
197. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.

198. For a discussion about this aspect of Rasul by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
199. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-84.
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initiate legislative action and mobilize legislative discourse, we predicted a greater likelihood of fulsome debate and public discourse on the
matter.
A vigorous debate ensued after the Rasul decision. The Executive
proposed to amend the habeas statute to reverse the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretation of federal jurisdiction resulting in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), which became law on December 30,
2005.2° The DTA was the product of a compromise within and among
the political branches. On the one hand, spearheaded by Republican
Senator and former prisoner of war John McCain, the DTA went further
in protecting detainees than the Supreme Court in Rasul by establishing
uniform standards for the interrogation of persons detained by the U.S.
military and establishing minimum standards for the treatment of detainees of any U.S. agency. 20 ' According to the DTA, "[n]o individual in
the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. '2°2 But at the
same time, the DTA severely restricted the role of the judiciary in
enforcing the norms it established: "Except as provided in section 1005
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider" habeas petitions filed by aliens
"detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba" or
"any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any
aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ' 2°3 The Act permits only the D.C. Circuit to
review the detention of accused combatants at Guantinamo, and even
then, only within certain narrow constraints. 2 °
The Court in Hamdan was faced with two weighty issues: (1)
whether Congress had effectively stripped it of jurisdiction to hear the
case; and (2) whether the military commissions established by the President were lawful. 20 5 The Court avoided deciding either question on constitutional grounds, ruling on both issues instead on narrower statutory
grounds, as it had done in Rasul before. Doing so once again left the
door open to and encouraged further action and debate by the political
200. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739-40 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
201. See id. § 1002(a), 119 Stat. at 2739 (requiring that all officials from the U.S. Department
of Defense who conduct interrogations comply with the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation).
202. Id. § 1003(a), 119 Stat. at 2739.
203. Id. § 1005(e)(l)-(2), 119 Stat. 2742.
204. See id. § 1005(e)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 2742.
205. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2745, 2755, 2764 (2004).
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branches because the burden of legislative inertia was placed squarely
upon the government: The President was required to seek congressional
authorization to proceed with military commissions as he had conceived
them. But once again, the Court did not establish any clear norms.
Rights afforded to defendants at courts-martial and to detainees during
wartime seem to be incorporated through existing statutes rather than
through independent sources. As such, the Court left on the table for
further legislative consideration the role of the judiciary in this process
and the norms to be applied. The Hamdan decision, while more dramatic than Rasul insofar as it invalidated the military commissions procedures, returned the matter to the political branches in a very similar
posture as Rasul.
Legislative action was again swift, and even more dramatic. The
MCA was enacted October 17, 2006.06 Its sponsors intended that it (1)
overrule Hamdan by authorizing military commissions to proceed; 20 7 (2)

remove the judiciary from the dialogue; 208 and (3) remove the law of
Geneva as an enforceable norm governing such detentions. 2 9 Although
it has been vigorously criticized by human-rights advocates, the MCA
did not go as far as it might have. While Hamdan left open the possibility that Congress could simply endorse the very procedures the Court
disapproved (for lack of legislative authority), the MCA instead declared
itself to be in compliance with the norms articulated by the Court,2 10
206. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 of U.S.C.).
207. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S 10414 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. McCain)
("[S]ome would prefer that Congress simply ignore the Hamdan decision and pass no legislation
at all. That, I suggest to my colleagues, would be a travesty.").
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e)(1) (2000) ("No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as
an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.").
209. MCA § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631 ("No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any
protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United
States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of
the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or
territories.").
210. See id. § 948b(f), 120 Stat. at 2602 ("A military commission established under this
chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the President achieved through the Act
much of what he sought to achieve through his executive order and the value of Haidan may be
limited to its disapproval of a domestically legislating Executive. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, An
Anti-Authoritarian Constitution? Four Notes, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1473, 1497 (2006) ("If the Act
[MCA] grants executive officials authority to proceed in much the same way that the Executive
Order at issue in Hamdan envisioned, now free from meaningful judicial review, the Supreme
Court's exercise may remain a notable reiteration of the constitutional understanding, however
explained, that unilateral presidential lawmaking is almost always dubious in principle.").
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while at the same time removing the judiciary's role in determining such
compliance. 21 ' The MCA also expressly distinguishes the treatment of
aliens and citizens abroad; the former forfeiting far more rights if determined to be an unlawful combatant.
After initially denying certiorari, the Supreme Court ultimately
decided to hear a set of cases challenging the lawfulness of the MCA.
The Court is now faced (again) with determining whether to apply
Eisentrager (this time as to whether the Fifth Amendment guarantees
habeas jurisdiction); the related question of whether the MCA runs afoul
of the Suspension Clause; and whether de facto sovereignty exists over
Guantdnamo such that aliens held there are entitled to fundamental constitutional rights. The difference is that Congress has now spoken
(twice) and articulated quite clearly its position. Our unified approach
asks whether there is a path remaining for the Court that will (1) maximize participation by the three branches of government; (2) provide
clear and predictable rules; (3) identify substantive norms to guide governmental action or judicial review or both; and (4) allocate the burden
of legislative inaction on the party best positioned to overcome it. It
would appear that the Court's options are narrowing. Because Congress
has now spoken clearly and repeatedly, the door to creative statutory
interpretation is closing (if not closed). In deciding this latest set of
cases, the Court might (1) uphold the recent legislation by finding that
Congress was empowered to remove the judiciary's role in reviewing
detention and trial of aliens held abroad as unlawful combatants; (2)
decide on quasi-constitutional grounds that the extensive dominion and
control over Guantdinamo amounts to de facto sovereignty and that
aliens held there are therefore entitled to fundamental constitutional
rights including habeas; or (3) decide on constitutional grounds that the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all persons detained by the government, wherever they are held.21 2
The first and third options would result in the exclusion of one or
more branches (the judiciary and political branches respectively) but
provide a clear legal rule with definite substantive norms (although not
211. See MCA § 948b(g), 120 Stat. at 2602 ("No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to
trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights."). In addition, the MCA recognizes that lawful enemy combatants are to be afforded all the
rights of court-martial defendants under the UCMJ. See id. § 948d(b), (c), 120 Stat. at 2603.
212. The choice of applying a constitutional rule will not be limited to aliens. In Munaf and
Omar, the Court will need to decide how U.S. citizens being held by a multi-national force or
foreign government may pursue claims to 4th and 5th Amendment protections. See supra note 32.
The grounds for such a rule may be the history of the availability of filing habeas petitions.
According to one scholar, the recent detention cases have overwhelmingly proceeded on a theory
of individual rights where historically, habeas has concerned itself only with the authority of the
jailer. See Jason A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1165, 1180-97.
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judicially enforceable in the case of option one). In both cases, legislative overrule would require constitutional amendment. In the first case,
the burden would fall to the detainees; in the third, to the government.
From the unified perspective, the choice between the first and third
options is analogous to the choice between the statutory and Eisentrager
rules presented in Rasul, the difference being that the legislative action
required is constitutional amendment. As explained above, the unified
perspective favors placing the burden of legislative inaction on the government under such conditions, weighing in favor of the third option.
The second option--de facto sovereignty-has the virtue of not excluding the political branches from the conversation and providing a clear set
of norms (i.e., fundamental constitutional rights). But, as explained
above, de facto sovereignty is a fuzzy rule that is unattractive from both
efficiency and social-justice perspectives. First, it runs the risk of having the same effect on governmental action as the third option while
making it less likely, due to its fuzziness, to lead to legislative action.
From the social-justice perspective, such a fuzzy rule might lead the
government to continue searching for the right locus of detention such
that justice in the form of judicial review is never guaranteed. Thus, the
choice among these options, from the unified perspective, compares the
benefit of preserving participation of the political branches (option 2)
against the advantages of a clear rule (option 3).
Because these features cannot be quantified, the utility of this
approach as a normative tool (or as a predictive one) is limited. What
we hope, however, is that it offers insights that might have been missed
in an analysis bounded by the parameters of one of the two schools of
legal thought presently occupying significant space within the legal
academy.
IV.

SOME NOTES ON (STILL) AGREEING

To

DISAGREE

As the above argument suggests, the unified approach provides
tools for analyzing which of the competing options for solving a problem serve certain purposes of disparate legal paradigms. Even though it
is possible to structure a conversation across disciplines about which
rule best serves the goals of efficiency and social justice, it is still important to stress principles from our individual methods that are instructive.
For CRT proponents, even if the statutory-jurisdiction rule ensures
both a measure of efficient process and protection for the disenfranchised, it is dangerous. With the exception of detained citizens
within the United States, who will likely receive constitutional protections, it is not clear what substantive law would be controlling.
Whatever its limitations, the Constitution's equal-protection doctrine
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does contain a set of ready-made substantive norms that courts are
familiar with applying.21 3 Other than the right to have their cases
reviewed, what measure of substantive legal protections would aliens be
provided? The positive hope would be that noncitizens receive a similar
(although not constitutionally mandated) measure of protection through
either domestic statute or the application of an international standard.
Although a promising idea to ponder, we have no idea what international
standard courts would apply. Worse yet, since the other alternative
would be statutorily created rights, the rights of outsiders would be subject to political whim. This rule then has the potential for inculcating an
equality disparity.
The problem with the statutory rule, like many rules based in L&E,
is one of process. Under the rule, all detainees would have hearings;
aliens, however, would be guaranteed nothing more than an opportunity
for formal equality. For L&E proponents, little attention appears to be
paid to the difference that exists between formal versus actual equality.
Perhaps the unassailable difference between the methodologies is in the
meaning given to process. L&E largely evaluates the administration of
justice through procedures and regulations, or what one scholar has
termed as the measures of "procedural fairness. 2 14 CRT, on the other
hand, can be said to be more concerned with what the same scholar has
termed "background fairness" and "stakes fairness. 2 1 5 These additional
measures of fairness accurately capture the concerns in the detention
cases-that all detainees are not treated the same in law and society, and
that no matter which rule is applied, Arab aliens may have the most to
lose.
For believers in CRT then, the L&E supporters' strong commitment to measures of procedural fairness and rational choice ensure that
the discipline operates in a manner that does not take context into
account sufficiently-failing to acknowledge how theoretical principles
actually operate. 2 16 Another scholar, Daria Roithmayr, has illustrated
this claim in the context of the operation of markets.2 17 According to
economic theory, racism, which should naturally be eliminated from

213. See Katyal, supra note 28, at 1368-70.
214. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 4.
215. See id. at 4 (referring to background fairness as those factors that ensure a "level playing
field," and referring to stakes fairness as what is at stake and for whom in the competition).
216. A similar claim has been made with regard to L&E reliance upon the rationality principle.
See RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (describing the legal overinvestment in the
rationality principle as a type of irrationality).
217. Daria Roithmayr, BarriersTo Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination,86 VA.

L.

REV.

727 (2000).

2008]

ENTERING UNPRECEDENTED TERRAIN

markets because it is inefficient, often persists. 21 8 Based on the historical significance of racial exclusion, Roithmayr proposes a "lock-in
model" of discrimination where markets remain affected by the behavior
over long periods of time.2 9
While cross-disciplinary approaches provide multiple and varied
bases to arrive at sometimes mutually acceptable conclusions, such alliances may not always be possible or preferred. 220 For example, in a
different project, it may not be possible to question the merits of process
theory, while also using it as a basis to reach a decision. Projects such
as this one, however, may result in those future moments of disagreement being less acrimonious and still involving an engaged discourse.
V.

CONCLUSION

The government's post-September 11 security measures have
sparked intense debate among scholars, politicians, and members of the
public. The public debate has been polarized and largely resistant to the
substantive exchange of ideas as has, in many respects, the scholarly
debate. This characteristic of the scholarly debate has roots that run far
deeper than the discussion of post-September 11 security measures: It
derives from the uncompromising nature of different (and mostly oppositional) schools of legal scholarship prioritizing incommensurate values, such as CRT's commitment to social justice versus L&E's
efficiency concerns.
We sought to apply a unified approach to this debate, using Edward
L. Rubin's theoretical framework to review post-September 11 governmental detentions. This subject matter is timely because the Supreme
Court is currently considering several new detainee and terrorism cases.
As with the first wave of cases, upon the Court's ruling we will be able
to see which rule preferences and normative values were found to be
persuasive. Our goal, however, was not to predict the Court's decision(s) or to settle the security-liberty schism, but rather to apply a
methodology that might lead to a more fruitful debate by bringing to
bear the features of different scholarly paradigms. Using L&E and CRT
principles, we compared alternative rules and evaluated each for responsiveness to efficiency and social-justice concerns, but also considered
the adaptability of each alternative rule and the effects of allocation of
218. See id. at 730-31. The model suggests "that racial disparities persist because
communities of color do not enjoy true equal opportunity to compete." Id. at 734.
219. Id.
220. Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword, Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L.
REV. 335, 336 (identifying the danger attendant in interdisciplinary studies); see also Barnes,
supra note 118, at 981-84 (asserting that CRT/feminist scholars should be careful to ensure
compatibility when partnering with other disciplines and approaches).
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responsibility among institutional components of our government. In
doing so, we discovered some common ground and points of disagreement that we must continue to address-together and within our varied
discourses. Similarities and differences aside, we hope to have also laid
the groundwork for a more meaningful exchange of ideas in the future
among scholars across seemingly incompatible disciplines.

